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BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD, BEYOND AL QAEDA:
THE DESTABILIZING LEGAL ARCHITECTURE
OF COUNTERTERRORISM
Robert M. Chesney*
By the end of the first post-9/11 decade, the legal architecture associated with
the U.S. government’s use of military detention and lethal force in the
counterterrorism setting had come to seem relatively stable, supported by a
remarkable degree of cross-branch and cross-party consensus (manifested by
legislation, judicial decisions, and consistency of policy across two very differ-
ent presidential administrations). That stability is certain to collapse during
the second post-9/11 decade, however, thanks to the rapid erosion of two fac-
tors that have played a critical role in generating the recent appearance of
consensus: the existence of an undisputed armed conflict in Afghanistan, as to
which the law of armed conflict clearly applies, and the existence of a relatively
identifiable enemy in the form of the original al Qaeda organization.
Several long-term trends contribute to the erosion of these stabilizing factors.
Most obviously, the overt phase of the war in Afghanistan is ending. At the
same time, the U.S. government for a host of reasons places ever more empha-
sis on what we might call the “shadow war” model (i.e., the use of low-visibil-
ity or even deniable means to capture, disrupt, or kill terrorism-related targets
in an array of locations around the world). The original al Qaeda organiza-
tion, meanwhile, is undergoing an extraordinary process of simultaneous deci-
mation, diffusion, and fragmentation; one upshot of this transformation has
been the proliferation of loosely related regional groups that have varying de-
grees of connection to the remaining core al Qaeda leadership.
These shifts in the strategic posture of both the United States and al Qaeda
profoundly disrupt the stability of the current legal architecture on which mili-
tary detention and lethal force rest. Specifically, these developments make it
far more difficult (though not impossible) to establish the relevance of the law
of armed conflict to U.S. counterterrorism activities, and they raise exceed-
ingly difficult questions regarding whom these activities lawfully may be di-
rected against. Critically, they also all but guarantee that there will be a new
wave of judicial intervention to consider those very questions. Bearing that in
mind, I conclude this Article by outlining steps that could be taken now to
better align the legal architecture with the trends described above.
* Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law. I thank Kenneth
Anderson, Jack Goldsmith, and Matthew Waxman for their comments and criticisms. I also
wish to thank those who provided comments after presentations at the U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School and at the “Worldwide Detainee Conference”
sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command.
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Introduction
The Gulf of Aden lies like a funnel between the Indian Ocean and the
Red Sea, bracketed by Yemen on its north shore and Somalia to the south.
On a typical day, it is flush with massive tankers and cargo vessels headed to
and from the Suez Canal. But the vessel that had the attention of U.S. gov-
ernment officials on April 19, 2011, was a much smaller affair, a mere fisher-
man’s skiff attempting to slip quietly across the Gulf from Yemen to
Somalia.1
1. Except as otherwise indicated, the following account of the investigation, capture,
and detention of Ahmed Warsame derives from Sealed Indictment, United States v. Warsame,
No. 1:11-cr-00559-UA (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2011), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/
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Onboard was a Somali man named Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. At the
time, that name meant nothing to most Americans. But, for a small circle of
U.S. government and military officials with access to the relevant intelli-
gence, Warsame was a decidedly threatening figure who personified troub-
ling changes sweeping through the counterterrorism landscape.
Warsame, you see, was not a member of al Qaeda, nor had he ever been
anywhere near the battlefields of Afghanistan. He was, instead, a member of
a Somali insurgent group known as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (the
“Movement of the Mujahideen Youth”), or simply “al-Shabaab.”2 Of course,
so too were hundreds if not thousands of other young Somali men. What
made Warsame different was that he had just spent time in Yemen as a guest
of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), receiving advanced training
in explosives and working to build ties between the two groups.
Warsame’s activities had set off alarm bells in Washington. AQAP,
though very much engaged in a localized effort to seize power in Yemen, had
repeatedly demonstrated its interest in carrying out attacks on American
targets, consistent with the larger strategic priorities set by the senior leader-
ship of the original al Qaeda network.3 Indeed, U.S. officials by early 2011
had come to see AQAP as the organization most likely to carry out a terror-
ist attack in America.4 Al-Shabaab, in contrast, had thus far confined its
operations to the East Africa region, and despite much talk of it becoming
an al Qaeda “franchise,” its leadership appeared divided on the wisdom of
that step. More significantly, perhaps, al Qaeda’s senior leadership was also
documents/231509-warsame-indictment.html; Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture 174,
237–39, 249–52, 256–60, 262–63 (2012); Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism
Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/07/07/world/africa/07detain.html?_r=1; and Press Release, U.S. Attorney S.
Dist. of N.Y., Accused al Shabaab Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to al
Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July11/warsameindictmentpr.pdf.
2. For an overview of al-Shabaab, see Stephanie Hanson, Backgrounder: Al-Shabaab,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot2_2009
0227.html?_r=1.
3. Most famously, AQAP dispatched Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to set off a bomb
hidden in his underwear on a flight to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. The September 2011
death of Anwar al-Awlaki—a U.S. citizen who appeared to spearhead AQAP’s external opera-
tions through propaganda, recruitment, and operational planning—appears not to have
brought an end to AQAP’s interest in striking the “Far Enemy.” See Sudarsan Raghavan et al.,
In Foiled Bomb Plot, AQAP Took Bait Dangled by Saudi Informant, Wash. Post, May 9, 2012,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-foiled-bomb-plot-aqap-took-bait-
dangled-by-saudi-informant/2012/05/09/gIQA9oXIEU_story.html. On al-Awlaki’s role, see
Greg Miller & Alice Fordham, Anwar al-Aulaqi Gets New Designation in Death, Posting to
Checkpoint Washington, Wash. Post (Sept. 30, 2011, 11:19 AM), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/aulaqi-gets-new-designation-in-death/2011/09/
30/gIQAsbF69K_blog.html.
4. See, e.g., Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape—Considerations for the 112th
Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 26 (2011) (statement of
Michael Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72212/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72212.pdf (“I actually consider al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula . . . probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland.”).
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divided on the al-Shabaab question.5 Osama bin Laden in particular appears
to have resisted formal ties, despite the arguments of other al Qaeda leaders.6
While al Qaeda may not have been prepared at that time to establish a for-
mal relationship with al-Shabaab, it could nonetheless encourage al-Shabaab
to expand its efforts beyond Somalia and emulate the AQAP model by
adopting a dual focus on local insurgency and periodic external operations
against American and other Western targets. Toward that end, therefore, al
Qaeda appears to have asked AQAP’s leadership to do what it could to reori-
ent al-Shabaab.
Warsame was likely the first fruit of that effort. His capture was also a
case study in the difficulty of describing the metes and bounds of the U.S.
government’s authority to use military detention and lethal force in the
name of counterterrorism. Could Warsame lawfully be killed outright,
should actionable intelligence regarding his location arise? Could he at least
be detained militarily without criminal charge, assuming capture was feasi-
ble? If the answer to either question was yes, did it follow that the same
would have been true for all members of al-Shabaab? What about other
groups or individuals that might have been in communication with al Qaeda
leaders or have been sympathetic to al Qaeda’s goals? With the original al
Qaeda network seemingly on the decline, and the threat posed by emergent
regional groups such as AQAP and perhaps now al-Shabaab waxing, these
were increasingly pressing questions.
Against this backdrop, the Obama Administration adopted a complex
approach to Warsame’s case. The administration placed Warsame on a “kill/
capture” list maintained by Joint Special Operations Command (“JSOC”).
JSOC operators watched closely as Warsame proceeded across the Gulf on
April 19, 2011 and the decision was made to attempt a capture.7 The opera-
tion came off in textbook fashion; they seized the vessel without a shot
fired.8 For the next two months Warsame languished in the brig of the USS
Boxer,9 undergoing interrogation in military custody. The stage was thus set
for what could become a significant test case for the scope of the govern-
ment’s detention authority. But before litigation could arise—indeed, before
the public learned of Warsame’s capture—the administration switched
gears. In a rather bold move, it transferred Warsame to civilian custody,
flying him to New York City to face criminal charges.
While shifting Warsame into the civilian criminal justice system may
have rendered the question of detention authority academic in his case,10 the
5. See Nelly Lahoud et al., Letters from Abbottabad 38–42 (2012), available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2
.pdf (reviewing documents seized in the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound).
6. See id.
7. See Klaidman, supra note 1, at 237–39.
8. Id. at 238–39.
9. The ship happened to be on station in the region as part of an antipiracy task force.
10. But see Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that
a person otherwise eligible for military detention may be held for the duration of hostilities
even after completing a criminal sentence).
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underlying issues remain. Indeed, situations comparable to Warsame’s are
likely to arise with increasing frequency in light of certain strategic trends
that I describe below. If they do, a future administration may not be inclined
to follow the Warsame model, either out of a commitment to making greater
use of the military detention option or out of concern for the domestic
political backlash that might result in the event of another transfer from
military to civilian custody.11 Congress, for its part, might eventually force
the issue by forbidding such transfers by statute (just as it has already for-
bidden such transfers in the case of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay).12
The ultimate lesson of the Warsame scenario is not that hard questions
about the authority to use military detention or lethal force in such settings
can be avoided but rather that they deserve sustained public attention. In the
pages that follow, I explain that the second post-9/11 decade will be increas-
ingly characterized by a kind of “shadow war,” taking place on an episodic
basis in locations far removed from zones of conventional combat opera-
tions and involving opponents not readily described as members of al Qaeda
as such. The legal architecture that developed to a point of seeming stability
over the past decade is not well adapted to this environment, and as time
goes by—as new Warsames emerge—the gaps will become increasingly ap-
parent and problematic.
* * *
Part I fleshes out my baseline claim that the status quo legal architecture
reached a point of apparent stability by the close of the first post-9/11 dec-
ade. Political debates still raged, of course, and legal criticism certainly con-
tinued in the pages of law review articles and advocacy group briefs. Yet
across a range of issues—including the use of military detention at Guanta-
namo and in Afghanistan, the use of reformed military commissions to
prosecute a narrowed set of offenses, and the use of drones to carry out
lethal strikes in remote areas—the most striking fact was the emergence of
cross-party and cross-branch consensus. The Obama Administration fa-
mously continued rather than terminated the core elements of various Bush
Administration counterterrorism programs (not to mention a dramatic ex-
pansion of the drone program), and three years’ worth of habeas corpus
litigation following the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Boumediene
v. Bush13 served primarily (and quite surprisingly to many) to validate the
legal foundation of the detention system. Congress, for its part, first took the
lead in reviving the military commission system, and then in the National
11. Warsame’s transfer to civilian custody in New York sparked sharp criticism in some
quarters. See, e.g., Marc. A. Thiessen, Obama’s Terrorist ‘Catch and Release’ Policy, Posting to
PostPartisan, Wash. Post (July 6, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-partisan/post/obamas-terrorist-catch-and-release-policy/2011/07/06/gIQALpxb0H_blog
.html.
12. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1027, 125 Stat. 1298, 1566–67 (2011).
13. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, reinvigorated the 2001 Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force, providing a fresh statutory foundation
for detention operations.
In Part II, I make the case that this consensus depended in significant
part on two factors. First, throughout the first post-9/11 decade there has
always been a “hot battlefield” in Afghanistan, an area involving high-inten-
sity, large-footprint conventional combat operations as to which there is no
serious dispute that the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) applies. This has
long provided a center of gravity for the legal debate surrounding the law of
counterterrorism, ensuring that there is at least some setting in which LOAC
authorities relating to detention and lethal force apply. Insofar as a given fact
pattern could be linked back to Afghanistan, therefore, it has been possible
to avoid thorny questions regarding the geographic scope of LOAC princi-
ples. Notably, the dozens of habeas cases of the first post-9/11 decade—
which collectively have played an outsized role in establishing the appear-
ance that the law has stabilized—almost entirely involve direct links to Af-
ghanistan.14 Second, throughout the same period there has also been at least
a working assumption that we can coherently identify the enemy by refer-
ring to al Qaeda and the Taliban (along with glancing-but-unelaborated ref-
erences to the “associated forces” of such groups). Again, the habeas case law
has played a critical role in cementing this impression of clarity.
In Part III, I demonstrate that both of these stabilizing factors are rap-
idly eroding in the face of larger strategic trends concerning both al Qaeda
and the United States. First, the United States, for a host of reasons (fiscal
constraints, diplomatic pressure, and a growing sense of policy futility), is
accelerating its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Second, the United States is
simultaneously shifting to a low-visibility “shadow war” strategy that will
rely on Special Operations Forces, CIA paramilitary forces, drones operated
by both, proxy forces, and quiet partnerships with foreign security services.15
Meanwhile, al Qaeda itself has fractured and diffused in pursuit of both the
security that comes from geographic dispersal of personnel into new regions
14. The sole exception involved an al Qaeda detainee captured in the United States
whose case rather tellingly produced badly splintered judicial opinions. See al-Marri v. Puc-
ciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam with separate opinions by Judges
Motz, Traxler, Gregory, Williams, Wilkinson, Niemeyer, and Duncan), vacated as moot sub
nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). For an overview of the larger body of deten-
tion case law, see Benjamin Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0 at 24–38
(2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/guan
tanamo%20wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes.pdf.
15. Journalists Daniel Klaidman and David Sanger each published illuminating ac-
counts in the summer of 2012 depicting this ongoing shift from an internal Obama Adminis-
tration perspective. See Klaidman, supra note 1; David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal
150 (2012) (“[T]he Obama Doctrine . . . asserts [that] adversaries can be effectively confronted
through indirect methods—without boots on the ground, without breaking the Treasury,
without repeating the mistakes of mission creep.”); id. at 243–47 (elaborating on the light
footprint strategy theme); see also Robert Burns et al., Drones, Computers New Weapons of US
Shadow Wars, Associated Press, June 16, 2012, available at 6/16/12 AP DataStream 20:05:32
(Westlaw).
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and a strategic vision that embraces decentralization in the form of relation-
ships with quasi-independent regional organizations that may have separate
origins and agendas. As a result, it grows ever more difficult to speak coher-
ently of “al Qaeda”; the senior leadership of the original network has been
decimated, and so-called franchises with uncertain (or no) ties to that lead-
ership are not only proliferating but are also rapidly emerging as more sig-
nificant threats to U.S. national security. The upshot is that soon no
undisputed hot battlefield will exist anywhere, and the center of gravity with
respect to the use of lethal force will continue shifting to locations like
Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. Already, these unorthodox scenarios are the
primary focus for the use of lethal force, and they will similarly be the
United States’ focus should it resume the practice of long-term military de-
tention for new detainees.
Part III also maps the disruptive legal consequences of these strategic
trends. My essential point is that the apparent stability of the post-9/11 legal
architecture—the semblance that some sort of sustained institutional settle-
ment has occurred—is an illusion. As the second post-9/11 decade pro-
gresses, policies associated with drone strikes and detention will
unquestionably face increasing legal friction, casting doubt over the legality
of the U.S. government’s use of detention and lethal force in an array of
settings.
In Part IV, I take up the questions of whether we really ought to care
about all this, and, if so, what—if anything—can and should be done. We
should care, for it will not be possible to simply ride out the increasing legal
friction. The current climate of judicial passivity—reflected in the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to reengage with the Guantanamo habeas cases,16 the
unwillingness of courts to adjudicate habeas petitions arising out of Afghan-
istan,17 and the unwillingness of a district judge to adjudicate a suit challeng-
ing the planned use of lethal force against an American citizen18—will not
last. For a host of reasons, a fresh wave of detention litigation concentrating
on these very issues is all but guaranteed to arise. That litigation will in turn
cast a substantial shadow over the use of lethal force, and, in any event, the
use of lethal force may yet receive direct judicial attention. Bearing all this in
mind, I conclude with a limited set of recommendations for addressing the
uncertainty that plagues this area. Some elements of that uncertainty, alas,
cannot readily be resolved. They arise in a pluralistic legal environment in
which a host of relevant actors simply do not share common ground with
respect to which bodies of law are applicable to these questions and what
those bodies of law can fairly be said to require. Others, however, can use-
fully be addressed through statutory innovation.
16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Interest, Nat’l L.J. (June 25, 2012), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202560493349.
17. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 95–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307, 08-2143, 2012 WL 5077483, at *5–7 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2012) (dis-
missing habeas petitions on remand notwithstanding claims of new evidence).
18. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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I. The First Post-9/11 Decade: From Instability to Institutional
Settlement
What a decade it was for the lawyers. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the
U.S. government famously adopted a set of counterterrorism policies involv-
ing, among other things, the use of military detention without criminal
charge or judicial review; prosecution for war crimes in a presidentially con-
structed system of military commissions; and coercive interrogation using
an array of methods including some that many perceived to be torture. Each
of these was fraught with legal questions, both domestic and international,
and predictably set off fierce legal disputes. By the middle of the first post-
9/11 decade, it was clear that these disputes were not going away, that the
disputes were driving policy change, and that more change—imposed both
internally and externally—was likely on the way. In due course, these
changes came about, and by the last years of the decade, the sense of insta-
bility had given way to an altogether different narrative.
By the close of the first post-9/11 decade, it seemed like an institutional
settlement of sorts had arrived. Legal disputes continued, but the sense that
they heralded a serious prospect of compelled policy change had largely dis-
appeared. Courts appeared to be in retreat, and where they remained en-
gaged, they largely endorsed the actions of the elected branches. Congress
was eager to entrench this status quo, and a new president from a different
political party—elected in part on a rule-of-law platform—embraced and
defended key elements of the framework as well. The public, meanwhile,
appeared largely exhausted with the whole topic. Across parties and
branches, the legal architecture appeared to have stabilized.
A. Legal Instability and the Post-9/11 Evolution of Counterterrorism Policy
The U.S. government’s practices relating to military detention, military
commissions, and interrogation sparked an extraordinary amount of legal
debate in the years following 9/11.19 Over time, it became increasingly ap-
parent that the legal ferment could well boil over, compelling policy
changes.
That is more or less what happened, repeatedly, between 2004 and 2008.
The Supreme Court ruled against the government in a series of cases that
reshaped the military detention process at Guantanamo (specifically, ensur-
ing access to counsel and the right to present fresh evidence to a federal
judge in an effort to determine the legal and factual propriety of individual
detention decisions).20 The Court also nullified the Bush Administration’s
attempt to craft a military commission trial system without express legisla-
tive authorization, noting along the way that Common Article Three of the
19. The literature on this topic is vast. For an insider account of the role of law and
lawyers in shaping national security policy during the Bush Administration, see Jack Gold-
smith, The Terror Presidency (2007).
20. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
509 (2004) (plurality opinion); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
November 2013] Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda 171
Geneva Conventions—with its strong language addressing the interrogation
of any persons held in custody—applies to the conflict with al Qaeda.21 Con-
gress intervened with legislation intended to prevent the use of the most
abusive interrogation techniques, while also reconstituting the military com-
mission system with new restraints and requiring the existence of some form
of judicial review for Guantanamo detainees even while attempting to fore-
close resort to habeas review in particular.22 Meanwhile, the executive
branch undertook to moderate a variety of policies, responding to the pros-
pect of judicial oversight and mounting domestic political pressure (cata-
lyzed by dramatic media exposés and the related litigation and advocacy
efforts of a sprawling network of NGOs, lawyers, scholars, and activists) and
no small amount of pressure from actors within the executive branch itself.23
The president acknowledged the existence of CIA detention sites, for exam-
ple, and ordered the detainees there to be removed to Guantanamo.24 The
Department of Defense repeatedly moderated the rules governing the
emerging military commission system,25 and with one eye squarely fixed on
the possibility of judicial review of military detention at Guantanamo, it also
voluntarily adopted a complex system of internal administrative review both
of the initial detention decision (the Combatant Status Review Tribunal sys-
tem) and of the decision to continue to hold specific persons over time (the
Administrative Review Board system).26 It eventually made a similar move in
Afghanistan, moreover, with the creation of the Detention Review Board
system.27
In short, both the legal and policy architectures for counterterrorism
evolved in fits and starts throughout this hotly contested period, generally in
the direction of increased constraint. By the final years of the first post-9/11
decade, however, the period of legal and policy ferment gave way to a period
of institutional settlement—a period that would largely track the opening
21. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613, 631 (2006).
22. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat.
2739; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, invalidated in
part by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
23. On the role of the decentralized network of civil society voices that have pushed
back against U.S. government counterterrorism policy, see Jack Goldsmith, Power and
Constraint (2012).
24. See President Bush Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR20060906
01425.html.
25. Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/25/international/world
special2/25gitmo.html?pagewanted=print&position.
26. See Combatant Status Review Tribunals/Administrative Review Boards, U.S. Depart-
ment of Def., http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_tribunalsarchive.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013) (compiling documents establishing the two systems and tracking their progress
from 2004–2005).
27. See Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liabil-
ity to Legitimacy, Army Law. (June 2010), at 9.
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years in office of a new president whose campaign had explicitly champi-
oned a return to rule-of-law values in national security affairs.
B. The Appearance of Institutional Settlement
The legal stabilization trend has been most pronounced with respect to
military detention policy, thanks to a combination of cross-branch and
cross-party developments.
Courts have played a critical role in this process. In the wake of
Boumediene, district judges began grappling with the merits of dozens of
habeas petitions brought by military detainees held at Guantanamo.28 When
it comes to resolving the factual disputes at the heart of these cases, results
have been mixed.29 But when it comes to the legal questions, the government
has prevailed across the board all along.
It helps to consider that there are two basic questions of law one might
ask in connection with military detention, broadly speaking. First, there is
the question of whether the government may lawfully use military detention
without criminal charge against any category of persons. Every judge en-
meshed in the Guantanamo habeas litigation has answered this question af-
firmatively, much as the Supreme Court itself did back in 2004 in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.30 Next, there is the question of how precisely to define the cate-
gory of detainable persons. In Hamdi, the Supreme Court confined itself to
addressing solely the scenario before it: an arms-bearing member of the Af-
ghan Taliban, captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan at a time when
armed conflict raged, and held in connection with that ongoing conflict.
Post-Boumediene, lower court judges encountered an array of distinct fact
patterns: persons linked to al Qaeda or other organizations participating in
the hostilities in Afghanistan; persons who were captured or arrested outside
Afghanistan; and persons whose conduct was considerably more removed
from the paradigm of an arms-bearing “soldier.”31 While these judges have
not always agreed as to the rationale for approving detention in such cases,
28. See Wittes et al., supra note 14, at 14, 57. Jack Goldsmith makes a powerful case
regarding the legitimizing impact that the resulting case law had with respect to the govern-
ment’s detention power. See Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 194 (“[T]he [Guantanamo Bay]
habeas corpus cases have . . . . empowered the presidency and the military, directly and indi-
rectly, in important ways.”).
29. See Wittes et al., supra note 14. It was rough sledding for the government early
on, with judges repeatedly taking a dim view of the evidence the government had put forward.
But over time, the record has evened out considerably. See id. Indeed, critics have taken to
denouncing the habeas review system as something of a sham, a betrayal of what they took
Boumediene to represent. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Ex-Judge: Boumediene Is Being “Gutted”,
SCOTUSblog (July 17, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ex-judge-
boumediene-is-being-gutted.
30. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
31. See Wittes et al., supra note 14.
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the important point is that a wide variety of them, including both Republi-
can and Democratic appointees, have so approved on some rationale.32 Ap-
pellate review of these decisions at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has
powerfully reinforced that conclusion, moreover, while also clarifying its
doctrinal foundations, and the Supreme Court has made clear in case after
case that it is not interested in further engagement with the question.33 In
short, the habeas process has proved to be a powerful engine for validating
the legal foundations of military detention, to the delight of some and the
horror of others.
Courts have not been alone in this project of settlement. Congress, too,
has played a significant role, though it only became engaged on the question
of detention authority after the courts cleared the path for it to do so
through the spate of rulings noted above. Previously, Congress had appeared
quite averse to the topic,34 but once the period of institutional settlement
was well underway in the judiciary, Congress joined the party by enacting
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (the “NDAA
FY12”).35 The NDAA FY12 was burdened with an array of complicated and
problematic detention provisions, including both constraints on the ability
of the executive branch to release or transfer military detainees once in cus-
tody at Guantanamo and a confusing—and ultimately quite ineffectual—
attempt to force the executive branch to opt for military detention (instead
of civilian criminal prosecution) in certain cases. But when it comes to the
fundamental questions of detention law—whether there is authority to de-
tain and to whom such authority applies—the NDAA FY12 was the embodi-
ment of the new climate of institutional settlement. The legislative history of
the statute is shot through with statements that the statute was meant to
codify the status quo as developed by the judiciary in the habeas case law.36
The statute itself speaks explicitly of simply affirming that the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) includes detention authority and that
32. See id. For a review of the doctrinal disagreements that have characterized these
cases, see Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens,
52 B.C. L. Rev. 769 (2011).
33. Chemerinsky, supra note 16.
34. True, Congress provided the original statutory foundation for detention when it
enacted the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which speci-
fied that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force” against the
entity responsible for the 9/11 attacks and anyone harboring that entity. But the AUMF fa-
mously did not actually address detention authority, let alone attempt to mark its metes and
bounds, which is one reason why there was so much legal debate on this topic in the following
years. And while Congress addressed related issues such as habeas jurisdiction, it avoided the
substance of this topic. Even after Boumediene in 2008 made clear that the judiciary would
now be obliged to develop the substantive law of detention on its own in the absence of
legislative intervention, Congress continued to shy away.
35. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§§ 1021–34, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562–73 (2011).
36. See, e.g., Letter from Edwin Meese, III, Former U.S. Att’y Gen., et al., to Howard P.
McKeon, Chairman, House Armed Servs. Comm. (May 9, 2012), available at http://armed
services.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=cbfe63cd-a38b-47c5-8b3c-0c532545fb8a.
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this authority extends to persons who are members or supporters of al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or “associated forces” engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners37—in other words, the precise formu-
lation that the government had been advancing, and the courts had been
accepting, for many years. The NDAA FY12 was, at bottom, a status quo
enactment in this respect, embodying what might be described as an
“AUMF good enough” spirit.
The sense that detention law had finally settled, however, was not just a
matter of the judiciary and Congress embracing the executive branch’s posi-
tion. Quite significantly—perhaps even most significantly—it also reflected a
surprising degree of cross-party consensus. Put more plainly, the perception
of an institutional settlement owes a great deal to the fact that the Obama
Administration substantially embraced the legal architecture of detention as
it had developed by the end of the Bush Administration. When the Obama
Administration came into power in early 2009, many observers wondered
whether and to what extent it would retreat from the Bush Administration’s
positions on the scope of the government’s detention authority. That ques-
tion came to a head very quickly, as one of the Guantanamo habeas cases
required a filing on this very matter less than two months after the inaugu-
ration.38 To the surprise of some, the Obama Administration not only con-
tinued to assert the legality of using military detention in that case and
others but in doing so, it also argued for essentially the same substantive
scope of authority as had the Bush Administration in its later years. Presi-
dent Obama, like President Bush, defended the view that it would be lawful
to detain both members and nonmember supporters of al Qaeda, the Af-
ghan Taliban, and “associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.”39 Obama differed from Bush in
this specific area in only three notable ways: (1) he abandoned the descrip-
tive label “enemy combatant” (which had come to have quite negative con-
notations), (2) he made clear that he viewed his authority as subject to
(though consistent with) LOAC, and (3) he described his authority as flow-
ing from the AUMF rather than from both the AUMF and his inherent au-
thority under Article II of the Constitution.40
37. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1021. An argument
can be made that this was not merely a codification exercise with respect to the portion of the
definition encompassing persons who are not members of these groups but are instead “sup-
porters” of them. The district court judges had split on this particular question to some extent,
while the D.C. Circuit had repeatedly endorsed the government’s view but only in dicta. For
more on this question, see Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad,
and the Laws of War—Part I, Lawfare (Dec. 31, 2011, 4:43 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2011/12/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-i/.
38. See Klaidman, supra note 1, at 58–59.
39. See No. 08-442 (D.D.C.), Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, at 2, Hamlily v. Obama,
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-
re-det-auth.pdf.
40. See id. at 1–3. Interestingly, the Obama Administration did not actually disclaim
the relevance of Article II in connection with detention authority. Nor did it prove shy about
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This was not just a temporary expedient forced on the new administra-
tion by a fast-moving litigation docket, though the initial exigency certainly
did force the administration’s hand.41 Later that same spring, the president
gave a marquee address at the National Archives concerning detention policy
and counterterrorism.42 Obama sounded strong rule-of-law themes and
made clear his preference for using civilian criminal prosecution when pos-
sible in terrorism-related cases.43 But he also explicitly endorsed the propri-
ety of using military commissions for prosecution in some settings and
military detention without criminal charge when necessary.44 In the months
and years since then, the Obama Administration has vigorously defended
the legality of detention in a host of Guantanamo habeas cases,45 apparently
only encountering significant internal discord with respect to the relatively
narrow question of whether it ought to claim detention authority as to per-
sons who are mere supporters—but not members—of AUMF-covered
groups when those persons are acting in locations remote from the “hot
battlefields.”46 And in a related vein, the administration has just as vigor-
ously fought to prevent the extension of judicial review to the use of military
detention in Afghanistan (both in cases involving Afghans captured there
and in more difficult cases involving non-Afghans captured elsewhere but
brought to Afghanistan for detention).47
invoking Article II authority, standing alone, later in connection with the use of force in Libya.
For a detailed account of Bush–Obama continuity, see Goldsmith, supra note 23 passim.
41. See Klaidman, supra note 1, at 58–59. Addressing other security-related policy de-
cisions forced to a head by the pressure of the litigation schedule, Klaidman quotes Obama on
another occasion venting that “[i]t’s another one of these damn litigation decisions they want
to talk about, and I’m tired of it. . . . I’m tired of being jammed this way.” Id. at 47.
42. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,




45. See Wittes et al., supra note 14. The fact that all this occurred at the same time
that the Obama Administration was calling for the closure of Guantanamo is of no moment.
The president in his 2009 National Archives speech made clear that continued military deten-
tion might be needed in some cases, and substantial efforts were made to establish a facility
within the United States in which such detainees could be held after the closure of Guanta-
namo. See Obama, supra note 42; see also Peter Slevin, Illinois Prison Picked for Detainees,
Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-12-16/news/
36834397_1_thomson-correctional-center-illinois-prison-guantanamo-bay.
46. John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism,
Remarks on Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws at the Harvard
Law School Program on Law and Security (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-
adhering-our-values-an; see also Klaidman, supra note 1; Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Di-
vided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=all.
47. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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This pattern of cross-branch and cross-party consensus gives the im-
pression that the legal architecture of detention has stabilized, but the settle-
ment phenomenon is not limited to detention policy. The same thing has
happened, albeit to a lesser extent, in other areas.48
The military commission prosecution system provides a good example.
When Obama came into office, it seemed quite possible, indeed likely, that
he would shut down the commission system. Indeed, the new president
promptly ordered all commission proceedings suspended pending a policy
review.49 In the end, however, the administration worked with the then-
Democratic-controlled Congress to pursue a mend-it-don’t-end-it approach
culminating in passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which ad-
dressed a number of key objections to the statutory framework Congress
and the Bush Administration had crafted in 2006.50 In his National Archives
address in spring 2009, moreover, Obama also made clear that he would use
this system in appropriate cases.51 He has duly done so, notwithstanding his
administration’s doomed attempt to prosecute the so-called “9/11 defend-
ants” (especially Khalid Sheikh Mohamed) in civilian courts. While difficult
questions still surround the commission system as to particular issues—such
as the propriety of charging “material support” offenses for pre-2006 con-
duct52—the system as a whole is far more stable today than it was at any
point in the past decade.53
There have been strong elements of cross-party continuity between the
Bush and Obama Administrations on an array of other counterterrorism
policy questions, including the propriety of using rendition in at least some
circumstances and, perhaps most notably, the legality of using lethal force
not just in contexts of overt combat deployments but also in areas physically
remote from the “hot battlefield.” Indeed, the Obama Administration
quickly outstripped its predecessor in terms of the quantity and location of
its airstrikes outside of Afghanistan,54 and it also greatly surpassed the Bush
48. Cf. David Kravets, Former CIA Chief: Obama’s War on Terror Same as Bush’s, but
with More Killing, Wired, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/bush-
obama-war-on-terror/ (noting opinion by former CIA and NSA director Michael Hayden that
there has been remarkable continuity across the Bush and Obama Administrations regarding
many national security issues).
49. See Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantanamo, Wash. Post,
Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/
20/AR2009012004743.html.
50. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. A, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat.
2574.
51. See Obama, supra note 42.
52. Larkin Reynolds & Wells Bennett, Hamdan Oral Argument Preview, Lawfare (May
2, 2012, 9:29 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/hamdan-oral-argument-preview/.
53. Policy changes contributing to the enhanced stability of the system include the ap-
pointment of top-tier personnel such as the current chief prosecutor, Brigadier General Mark
Martins, as well as significant improvements in the transparency of system proceedings and
filings.
54. See, e.g., Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in
Pakistan, 2004–2012, Long War J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (last
November 2013] Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda 177
Administration in its efforts to marshal public defenses of the legality of
these actions.55 What is more, the Obama Administration succeeded in fend-
ing off a lawsuit challenging the legality of the drone-strike program (in the
specific context of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and member of
AQAP known to be on a list of approved targets for the use of deadly force
in Yemen, who was in fact killed in a drone strike some months later).56
The point is not to claim that legal disputes surrounding these
counterterrorism policies have effectively ended. Far from it; a steady drum-
beat of criticism persists, especially in relation to the use of lethal force via
drones. But by the end of the first post-9/11 decade, this criticism no longer
seemed likely to spill over in the form of disruptive judicial rulings, newly
restrictive legislation, or significant spikes in diplomatic or domestic politi-
cal pressure, as had repeatedly occurred in earlier years. Years of law-con-
scious policy refinement—and quite possibly some degree of public fatigue
or inurement when it came to legal criticisms—had made possible an ex-
tended period of cross-branch and cross-party consensus. This development
in turn left the impression that the underlying legal architecture had reached
a stage of stability that was good enough for the time being.
II. Foundations of the Apparent Institutional Settlement (and
What They Obscure)
This perception of institutional settlement is an illusion. It depends on
the existence of a set of stabilizing factors—large-scale U.S. involvement in
undisputed armed conflict in Afghanistan and a relatively clear conception
of the identity of the enemy—that are rapidly decaying. For years these fac-
tors drew our attention away from a pair of critical and wholly unresolved
legal issues that might best be described as “boundary questions.” Now, it is
rapidly becoming apparent that these boundary questions are central to de-
termining the boundaries of the government’s authority to detain and to kill
in the name of counterterrorism.
A. What Are the Boundary Questions?
It is hard to talk sensibly about the legality of using detention or lethal
force in a particular case without taking a position, explicitly or otherwise,
on the relevance of LOAC to the analysis. And it is equally difficult to do so
without some coherent conception of the identity of the “enemy,” at both
updated Feb. 8, 2013, 4:46 PM); Bill Roggio & Bob Barry, Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes
in Yemen, 2002–2013, Long War J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/
Yemen-strike.php (last updated Jan. 23, 2013, 8:02 PM).
55. See Kenneth Anderson, Readings: The Canonical National Security Law Speeches of
Obama Administration Senior Officials and General Counsels, Lawfare (Aug. 28, 2012, 3:37
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/readings-the-canonical-national-security-law-
speeches-of-obama-administration-senior-officials-and-general-counsels/.
56. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); Islamist Cleric Anwar al-
Awlaki Killed in Yemen, BBC News (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-15121879.
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the individual and organizational levels. Both sets of issues are critical to
defining the legal boundaries of the government’s powers. Given the appar-
ent stability of the legal architecture in recent years, one might suppose that
both questions had been largely resolved. Far from it, however.
1. In What Circumstances Does LOAC Govern?
Consider first the LOAC problem. LOAC—also known today as Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) and formerly known simply as the law of
war—provides an array of rules governing the permissible means and meth-
ods of armed conflict (including who may be killed and under what circum-
stances) and the proper treatment and disposition of persons who fall into
the hands of the enemy in such circumstances (including who may be de-
tained for the duration of hostilities without criminal charge).57 But once we
move beyond the paradigm case of two states using their regular armed
forces against one another, pinning down the precise circumstances gov-
erned by LOAC—LOAC’s “field of application”—proves to be a rather diffi-
cult task.
It is not that people disagree about the test for LOAC’s field of applica-
tion, at least not when stated in abstract terms. When dealing with a situa-
tion involving a state party on one side and a nonstate actor on the other,
there is widespread agreement that the nonstate party must possess (at least)
some sufficient degree of organizational coherence and that the violence at
issue must rise to some sufficient level of intensity (taking into account fac-
tors such as the nature, scale, methods, impact, and duration of the vio-
lence).58 So far so good. But once we move to apply this test to a particular
fact pattern, we quickly discover that the room for disagreements is substan-
tial. The general outlines of the test appear settled, but the agreement does
not extend to the granular level, let alone to the proper application and
results in particular cases.
First, it is entirely unclear just where the line lies between the level of
intensity at which violence remains a matter of civil disorder or criminality
and the level at which it earns the title “armed conflict.” That is to say, there
is no clear consensus as to the metrics, such as number of deaths or types of
57. For an introduction to the area suited for a general audience, see Int’l Comm. of
the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law (2002), available at http://www.icrc
.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0703.pdf. For a casebook approach designed from an op-
erational perspective, see Geoffrey S. Corn et al., The Law of Armed Conflict (2012). See
also U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual No. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
(1956).
58. See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law 252–61 (2008);
Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether
There Is a “Legal Geography of War” 5–7, in Future Challenges in National Security and
Law (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Future
Challenges_Anderson.pdf. Monica Hakimi points out that “[t]he test for identifying nonin-
ternational armed conflicts is notoriously deficient” but also that “[m]ost decisionmakers con-
sider” the same factors at a high level of generality. Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to
Targeting and Detention, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1365, 1374 (2012).
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weaponry, to be used in objectively calibrating the elements of the intensity
inquiry. It is a holistic inquiry with inevitable room for disagreement among
reasonable persons in marginal cases. Second, even if the metrics for the test
were clearer, disagreement can also arise because of uncertainty regarding
which fact patterns are properly made the objects of that inquiry. Consider,
from this viewpoint, the circumstances of AQAP in Yemen. The United
States has repeatedly used lethal force against AQAP targets—at least forty
times between 2010 and August 4, 2012, according to one source59—and
AQAP has on a few occasions attempted to set off bombs on United
States–bound planes.60 AQAP and the Yemeni government have engaged in
much more numerous exchanges of fire,61 and of course the United States,
other governments, and other elements of the al Qaeda network have had
their violent interactions as well. Does all of this count in assessing the in-
tensity factor? If only part of this counts, which part? And over what time
period does the inquiry properly extend? It is not clear that these questions
only admit of a single correct answer. Third, there may also be disagreement
as to the underlying facts themselves: who actually carried out which ac-
tions, with what intentions or knowledge, and toward what ends and with
what consequences.
Assuming that one overcomes these obstacles, a separate boundary issue
involving LOAC then arises: Are there geographic constraints with respect to
where LOAC may apply?62 That is, if we assume that the conditions for rec-
ognition of an armed conflict are satisfied in, say, Afghanistan, does it follow
that LOAC applies not only in Afghanistan but also in other locations
around the world, no matter how remote from Afghanistan, so long as the
parties to the conflict in Afghanistan encounter one another there? The U.S.
government takes the position that LOAC travels with the parties wherever
they might roam.63 Others disagree. One viewpoint, for example, holds that
59. See Roggio & Barry, supra note 54.
60. See, e.g., Julian Borger et al., Cargo Plane Bomb Plot: Saudi Double Agent ‘Gave
Crucial Alert’, Guardian, Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/01/cargo-
plane-plot-saudi-agent-gave-alert; Peter Finn, Attempted Bomber of Detroit-Bound Plane Gets
Life in Prison, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/attempted-bomber-of-detroit-bound-plane-gets-life-in-prison/2012/02/16/gI
QAE3uHIR_story.html; Raghavan et al., supra note 3 (describing collapse of a plot in late
spring 2012).
61. For a detailed collection of events, see Cody Curran et al., AQAP and Suspected
AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010, 2011, and 2012, Critical Threats (May 21, 2012),
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010.
62. See Anderson, supra note 58, at 10–16; see also Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battle-
field in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone
of Combat, 39 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 11–14 (2010); Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of
the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2049532).
63. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 46 (“An area in which there is some disagreement is
the geographic scope of the conflict. The United States does not view our authority to use
military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghani-
stan. . . . Others in the international community—including some of our closest allies and
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LOAC has no application outside the geographic boundaries of the specific
state in which events satisfy the threshold-of-intensity criterion; another ac-
cepts that LOAC can apply to persons outside the borders of such a state, but
only where their activities in some meaningful sense tie back to the original
zone of hostilities (such as by exercising remote command of operations).64
Boundary questions also emerge along the temporal dimension. That is,
even if we assume that a state of armed conflict existed in connection with
some particular situation of violence in some relevant location, difficult
questions can arise as to precisely when that situation achieved this status65
and for how long thereafter that status remains in play.66 There is little doubt
that the problem of temporal boundaries is particularly vexing in a circum-
stance in which the precise identity of the opponent is in question—which
brings us to our next set of boundary questions.
2. Who Precisely Is the Enemy?
Separate from (though not unrelated to) the LOAC boundary issue is
the question of how precisely to identify the enemy or opponent in whatever
conflict (or other paradigm of interactions) is at issue. One would hardly
think twice about this in a conventional state-against-state armed conflict,
both because of the central role that visible and discrete armed forces play in
that setting and because the domestic-law instruments associated with such
conflicts—declarations of war, authorizations for use of military force—
would typically provide an express answer to the question. But it is a step
that can prove quite complicated in the context of noninternational armed
conflict, particularly where the operative domestic law instruments do not
partners—take a different view of the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the
‘hot’ battlefields.”).
64. See, e.g., Melzer, supra note 58, at 257–61, 267; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Defining
Armed Conflict, 13 J. Conflict & Security L. 393 (2008); Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l
Comm. of the Red Cross, Grotius Lecture: Confronting Complexity Through Law: The Case
for Reason, Vision and Humanity 7 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/sites/default
/files/files/Grotius%20Lecture%202012.pdf (“It should be recalled that the ICRC does not
share the view that a conflict of such [transnational] scope [against al Qaeda and its associated
forces], previously known as the ‘war against terrorism’, [sic] is taking place.”); Daniel Cahen
through Robert Chesney, Guest Post from the ICRC’s Daniel Cahen Responding to My Post on
Syria/LOAC, Lawfare (July 17, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/guest-
post-from-the-icrcs-daniel-cahen-responding-to-my-post-on-syrialoac/. For an exceptionally
useful overview of the clashing viewpoints, see Daskal, supra note 62, at 8–19.
65. This issue lurks in the background of the charges in some military commission
prosecutions, for example, insofar as they turn on pre-9/11 conduct—though the personal
jurisdiction provisions of the commission system appear to contemplate pre-9/11 conduct
explicitly, thus muddying the waters. Cf. John C. Dehn, An Opportunity for Judicial Review of
the Existence of Armed Conflict?, Opinio Juris (Aug. 19, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://opiniojuris.
org/2011/08/19/an-opportunity-for-judicial-review-of-the-existence-of-armed-conflict/.
66. See Mary L. Dudziak, War•Time (2012) (deconstructing the notion that war has
discernible temporal boundaries); see also Samuel Moyn, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its
Consequences, Lawfare (May 24, 2012, 11:10 AM) (book review), http://www.lawfareblog
.com/2012/05/war-time-an-idea-its-history-its-consequences/.
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actually name the enemy. For example, with nonstate actors it may be ex-
ceedingly difficult to distinguish which groups should be understood as
jointly comprising a single entity, which are distinct yet mutually engaged in
the conflict, and which might be sympathetic with or supportive of a party
to the conflict without actually being a party to the conflict. All these inquir-
ies become even more difficult where the groups involved seek to obscure
their location, membership, organizational structure, and activities.
B. Stabilizing Factors That Obscure the Boundary Questions
How can it be, in light of these boundary issues, that in recent years the
legal architecture for the U.S. government’s use of detention and lethal force
has acquired a veneer of stability? It is not because these boundary questions
have been resolved nor because they are novel. It is because certain stabiliz-
ing factors have spared us the need to focus on them.67
1. Undisputed Armed Conflict in Afghanistan
Throughout the post-9/11 era—well, at least since November 2001—
there has always been at least one circumstance in which it is essentially
undisputed that the United States was engaged in armed conflict. Specifi-
cally, the United States has been engaged in large-scale, overt combat opera-
tions in Afghanistan at all relevant times, and for a number of years in the
midst of this period, it was similarly engaged in Iraq. There is no serious
dispute that circumstances in Afghanistan constitute armed conflict nor that
LOAC applies there as a result. This has long ensured that the U.S. govern-
ment can argue with great force that it is fighting under color of LOAC—at
least somewhere against someone.
That would not matter to the larger debate if the use of detention and
lethal force in Afghanistan had been largely a sideshow over the years, rela-
tive to activities elsewhere. But the opposite has been the case. Afghanistan
has dominated perceptions of how and where the United States uses military
force in relation to terrorism (though Iraq had its moment as well, of
course). And this is especially true when it comes to the handful of occasions
when the government’s legal theories have been put to the test in a serious
and high-profile way.
One such occasion was the 2004 Supreme Court decision involving the
detention of Yaser Hamdi, a man who was captured in Afghanistan and
taken to Guantanamo but then brought to America after officials learned
67. To be clear, I am contending that the stabilizing factors discussed below (clarity as
to the existence of a LOAC–governed armed conflict in Afghanistan and relative clarity as to
the identity of the enemy) have combined to generate cases and fact patterns that have occu-
pied the lion’s share of attention when it comes to determining the legal boundaries of the
government’s authority. These cases and fact patterns are not challenging, however, from the
point of view of the aforementioned boundary questions. Collectively, they give an inaccurate
impression of resolution, which in turn facilitates the apparent cross-branch, cross-party con-
sensus that emerged late in the first post-9/11 decade. That consensus also reflects a substantial
amount of policy agreement and perhaps policy fatigue as well.
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that he had a plausible claim to U.S. citizenship.68 The Supreme Court’s
decision in his case played a central role in legitimizing the use of military
detention and confirming the relevance of LOAC as part of the governing
legal architecture. To be sure, the plurality opinion took pains to specify that
it was solely addressing the facts of Hamdi’s case (an alleged Taliban fighter
caught bearing arms with his unit on an Afghan battlefield and held while
the conflict in Afghanistan continued).69 Indeed, the opinion anticipated the
possibility that detention in other circumstances may not warrant applica-
tion of the traditional legal framework for detention associated with LOAC:
If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that under-
standing may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.
Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing
in Afghanistan.70
Nonetheless, the decision contributed to a larger perception that there is
little need to engage with the LOAC boundary question, assisted, no doubt,
by the fact that the Supreme Court has not taken a similar case since then—
let alone one presenting a fact pattern lacking ties to Afghanistan.
The work of the lower courts in more recent years has been to similar
effect. As noted above in Section I.B, the decisions emerging from the Guan-
tanamo habeas process have roundly endorsed the government’s viewpoint
(i.e., that the detention-facilitating rules of LOAC are applicable and are
consistent with U.S. government practices).71 Just like Hamdi, however,
these cases are very much rooted in the comparatively easy context of Af-
ghanistan. The overwhelming majority of Guantanamo habeas cases concern
persons who were captured in Afghanistan, captured fleeing from Afghani-
stan, or captured in more remote locations where they allegedly were en-
gaged in activities linked to the hostilities in Afghanistan (such as recruiting
fighters to go there).72 And so long as U.S. forces continue to engage in overt
combat operations in Afghanistan—so long as the condition specified by the
Supreme Court in Hamdi continues to apply—these cases are largely incapa-
ble of providing the occasion to test the outer boundaries of the LOAC
model.
Even the quite distinct habeas proceedings involving American citizen
Jose Padilla—an alleged al Qaeda “sleeper” agent arrested on a jetway in
Chicago upon his return to the country from Pakistan—eventually turned
on claims about Padilla’s prior activities relating to Afghanistan.73 The sole
68. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
69. See id. at 518 (specifying that the holding concerns “detention of individuals falling
into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in
which they were captured”).
70. Id. at 521.
71. See supra Section I.B.
72. See Wittes et al., supra note 14, at 24–38.
73. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). Before the Supreme Court could
weigh in on the matter, the government transferred Padilla to the civilian criminal justice
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case that appeared to lack any particular ties to Afghanistan—that involving
Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri, a Qatari citizen arrested in the United States and
then held in military detention as a suspected al Qaeda agent—made little
headway one way or another with respect to the LOAC model. The various
judicial opinions it produced were badly splintered and the issues were
clouded by the peculiar considerations raised by the invocation of military
detention authority within the United States proper.74
Collectively, this multi-year run of judicial decisions has played an influ-
ential role in forming perceptions about the legality of U.S. detention policy
due to their unique status as an adversarial and highly public forum for
contesting the government’s legal claims regarding its counterterrorism
powers. Again and again, these cases have accepted the applicability of LOAC
and the subsidiary notion that detention authority exists under that rubric.
This agreement has played a central role in molding the public’s under-
standing of the legitimacy of those claims, not to mention impacting con-
gressional perceptions. Yet it has gone largely unremarked that almost all
these decisions concern the one location in which there has been no disa-
greement that an armed conflict exists, the one location where the LOAC
boundary issues have little significance.
2. Relative Clarity as to the Identity of the Enemy
The perception of legal stability at the close of the first post-9/11 decade
also benefitted mightily from a second stabilizing factor: relative clarity with
respect to the identity of the enemy.
At the outset in 2001, there was no serious dispute that an entity known
as al Qaeda existed, that al Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and
that al Qaeda was to be the central object of the use of force that would
follow.75 It was equally clear that the Afghan Taliban movement existed, that
it controlled the bulk of Afghanistan’s territory, that its leadership tolerated
the presence in Afghanistan of a substantial part of al Qaeda (including al
Qaeda’s own senior leadership), and that, as a result, the deployment of
sustained military force against al Qaeda would likely require the use of
force against the Afghan Taliban as well.76 What followed was a massive,
overt military intervention in Afghanistan, squarely focused on al Qaeda and
the Afghan Taliban.77 This focus closely tracked the broad outlines of the
system, where he was ultimately convicted. Abby Goodnough, Jose Padilla Convicted on All
Counts in Terror Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
08/16/us/16cnd-padilla.html.
74. See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam),
vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
75. See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission
Report 330–34 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Comm’n Report], available at http://www.9-11
commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
76. See id.
77. See Michael E. O’Hanlon, A Flawed Masterpiece, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002),
at 47–48.
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AUMF that Congress enacted in September 2001 (which spoke of using force
only against the entity responsible for the 9/11 attacks and anyone harboring
that entity).78 And although at the time Bush argued publicly for a far more
ambitious and expansive counterterrorism agenda—giving rise to the much-
criticized formulation of the “Global War on Terror,” entailing the possibil-
ity of using force against other terrorist groups of international reach even if
unrelated to the 9/11 attacks79—the pushback sparked by this broadening
rhetoric underscored the notion that the fight properly encompassed just al
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.80
Subsequent legal challenges to the use of military detention repeatedly
reinforced the understanding that there was a clearly identified enemy in the
form of al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The Supreme Court’s 2004 Hamdi
decision, as noted above, dealt with a man said to be a fighter for the Afghan
Taliban.81 The government asserted that Jose Padilla was an al Qaeda agent,
dispatched to the United States by the al Qaeda senior leadership.82 And in a
seemingly endless parade of post-2008 Guantanamo habeas cases, the gov-
ernment almost invariably alleged that the men were Afghan Taliban mem-
bers, al Qaeda members, or in many instances both.83 Very few of the
Guantanamo cases involved any other organizational affiliation. The few that
did, moreover, not only drew little attention but also could be understood as
involving only minor and logical extensions of the Afghanistan hostilities in
order to encompass manifestly distinct groups that had nonetheless openly
joined the fighting against American and allied forces on the ground in Af-
ghanistan, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
(“HIG”)84 and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (“IMU”).85
78. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
79. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), in 37
Wkly. Compilation Presidential Documents 1347, 1348, available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-24/pdf/WCPD-2001-09-24-Pg1347.pdf (“Our war on terror begins
with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global
reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”).
80. The criticism that the war in Iraq distracted the United States from Afghanistan also
advanced the impression that the proper understanding of the post-9/11 conflict was that it
concerned al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
81. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
82. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2004).
83. See Wittes et al., supra note 14, at 24–38.
84. See Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding in a brief
discussion that HIG qualifies as an “associated force” of al Qaeda), aff’d, 655 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
85. See Al Harbi v. Obama, No. 05-02479, 2010 WL 2398883, at *16 (D.D.C. May 13,
2010) (concluding that government lacked evidence linking alleged IMU member to IMU or al
Qaeda). Note that the government has subsequently put forth new classified evidence in seek-
ing relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Raffaela Wakeman, Checking in on
the Mingazov Case, Lawfare (June 21, 2012, 6:10 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/
checking-in-on-the-mingazov-case/; Raffaela Wakeman, Mingazov Remanded to District Court,
Lawfare (Aug. 23, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/mingazov-remanded
-to-district-court/. For an overview of IMU’s origins and evolution, with an emphasis on the
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These cases almost never presented serious questions as to the organiza-
tional boundaries of al Qaeda itself or the AUMF more broadly, as opposed
to endless difficulties surrounding the alleged ties of specific persons to spe-
cific groups. The sole exception was Parhat v. Gates, a 2008 D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals decision concluding that the government lacked sufficient
proof to show that the Chinese Uighur group known as “ETIM”—the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement—was part and parcel of the al Qaeda net-
work.86 This was the exception that proved the rule, however. Far from
portending a rash of cases presenting more difficult variations on the orga-
nizational boundaries theme, Parhat was followed by years of Guantanamo
habeas cases that presented no such issues.
The relative uniformity and simplicity of the Guantanamo cases when it
comes to the question of organizational boundaries is not surprising for
another reason: the bulk of detainees there were captured relatively early in
the post-9/11 era. Those detainees hail from a period in the life cycle of al
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban that predates most of the complexities that I
will describe below. The resulting case law is bound to reflect the simpler
circumstances that prevailed early in the first post-9/11 decade. Insofar as
that case law has played an important role in constructing perceptions of
legal stability, these perceptions are more than a little artificial.
III. Disruptive Strategic Change
These stabilizing factors will not last. A set of long-term trends involving
changes to the strategic posture of both al Qaeda and the United States will
profoundly disrupt them. Indeed, that process is already well underway. Bit
by bit, this erosion is unsettling the legal foundation for the U.S. govern-
ment’s use of both military detention and lethal force.
A. Strategic Change and the Evolution of al Qaeda
Who is the enemy against which the United States is fighting in the
second post-9/11 decade? That fundamental question has grown ever more
difficult over time, and the problem is accelerating.
There may have been a time when it would suffice to refer simply to al
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in answer to this question. But this is no
longer an adequate response for two reasons. First, in Afghanistan, U.S.
forces have been engaged in combat for years with a large number of armed
groups that cannot properly be considered part of either al Qaeda or the
Afghan Taliban. Second, al Qaeda itself has undergone an extraordinary pro-
cess of diffusion and fragmentation. One upshot is that, in a number of
regions around the world, there are armed groups claiming some degree of
varied ways in which IMU has connected to both the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, see Chris-
topher Swift, Militant Pathways: Local Radicalization and Regional Migration in Central Asia,
CTC Sentinel, Nov. 2011, at 8, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2011/12/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss11-123.pdf.
86. 532 F.3d 834, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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association with what remains of al Qaeda’s senior leadership. Sometimes
this is a matter of an al Qaeda cell growing independent, and sometimes it is
a matter of an originally distinct entity drawing close to al Qaeda’s orbit.
The important point, at any rate, is that it is difficult to say which, if any, of
these groups are best understood as part of al Qaeda, which of these groups
are not part of al Qaeda yet nonetheless constitute enemies of the United
States, and which of these groups are neither. Warsame’s fact pattern is a
case in point. Unfortunately, such scenarios do not fit comfortably within
the existing domestic legal architecture embodied in the AUMF, the NDAA
FY12, and the case law generated by military detainees.
1. Proliferation and Fragmentation
The proliferation of enemies is most apparent in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan (although it is not limited to that region, as I will explain below). The
point as to proliferation in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region is not simply
that the organizational boundaries of the Afghan Taliban can be hard to
describe. Even if we treat the Afghan Taliban as a unified whole (i.e., lump
together all commanders loyal to some degree to Mullah Mohamed Omar’s
Quetta Shura), the fact remains that there have long been many other armed
groups in the field in Afghanistan that cannot fairly be described as a formal
part of either the Afghan Taliban or al Qaeda, including the Haqqani Net-
work and the HIG.87 Each of these armed groups routinely uses force against
U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan (and some but not all direct force
against Pakistani forces as well), and U.S. forces routinely target and detain
their leaders and members in turn.88 Because these groups cooperate exten-
sively, it can be exceedingly difficult to parse the organizational boundaries
87. See Seth G. Jones, Nat’l Def. Research Inst., Counterinsurgency in Afghan-
istan 37 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/
RAND_MG595.pdf (“The insurgency in Afghanistan included six main insurgent groups: the
Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters (mostly Arabs and Central
Asians), tribes based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and criminal networks.”); Kimberly Dozier,
AP Sources: US Mulls New Covert Raids in Pakistan, Associated Press, June 22, 2012, available
at 6/22/12 AP DataStream 16:24:58 (Westlaw) (discussing conflict with the Haqqani Network).
But see Bill Roggio, Haqqani Network Is Part of the Taliban—Siraj Haqqani, Long War J. (Oct.
5, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/siraj_haqqani_denies.php (report-
ing statement from Siraj Haqqani disputing American claims that the Haqqani Network is not
part of the Afghan Taliban). Making matters more complicated still, there also are at least
some groups that appear to partner with the Afghan Taliban for purposes not directly related
to combat operations in the region. See Bill Roggio, Turkish Jihadist Group Has Agreement to
Train with Afghan Taliban, Long War J. (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2012/04/turkish_jihadist_lea.php (describing training camp-focused agreement).
88. See Jones, supra note 87, at 37–66. The blog Long War Journal, sponsored by the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, provides frequent updates of small-scale firefights
and other fights between coalition forces and a broad array of these insurgent groups in Af-
ghanistan. Long War J., www.longwarjournal.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). For a recent
example involving an American drone strike in Pakistan targeting the leader of the IMU, see
Declan Walsh and Ismail Khan, Uzbek Group Says Drone Killed Leader, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,
2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-
uzbek-militant-leader.html.
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between them. As an anonymous American military officer put the point in
late 2010, “This is actually a syndicate of related and associated militant
groups and networks. . . . Trying to parse them, as if they have firewalls in
between them, is really kind of silly. They cooperate with each other. They
franchise work with each other.”89 Other officials added that “the loose fed-
eration was not managed by a traditional military command-and-control
system, but was more akin to a social network of relationships that rose and
faded as the groups decided on ways to attack Afghan, Pakistani, American
and NATO interests.”90 Organizational ambiguity from this perspective is
not so much a problem of inadequate intelligence (though that certainly
could be an issue) as it is simply an organic and irreducible feature of the
socio-political landscape within which these groups and networks operate.
Having said all that, the blurred organizational boundaries in the Af-
ghanistan–Pakistan theater are not the biggest reason why the two-party, al
Qaeda–Taliban conception of the enemy is problematic. The bigger problem
is the fragmentation and diffusion of al Qaeda itself: it has evolved over the
past decade in a manner that makes it far more difficult to speak coherently
about its organizational boundaries, and the trend appears to be
accelerating.91
Al Qaeda has been evolving throughout its existence.92 Born in the wan-
ing days of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, it began as a rather under-
specified collaborative project that the leaders of several existing groups and
networks, including bin Laden, agreed to.93 A number of members were
soon sworn in to the new group,94 and by the time it became based in the
Sudan, al Qaeda had become quite institutionalized, possessing bureaucratic
structures, job descriptions, payrolls, and other accoutrements of a hierar-
chical organization with centralized leadership.95
Fast-forward a few years to Afghanistan, and the situation was more
complex. Al Qaeda now had a center of operations from which its senior
leadership could act with relative impunity to recruit and train personnel in
large numbers.96 Not all those trainees necessarily were best understood as
part of al Qaeda; the bulk of them went on to fight, or assist the fighting, in
places like Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Bosnia, or else simply returned to live
89. Thom Shanker, Insurgents Set Aside Rivalries on Afghan Border, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29/world/asia/29military.html?page
wanted=all (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. See John Rollins, Cong. Research Serv., R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates:
Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.
92. Useful secondary sources on the origins and evolution of al Qaeda include Peter L.
Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (2002); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (2004); 9/11 Comm’n Report,
supra note 75; and Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (2006).
93. See Wright, supra note 92, at 132–34.
94. See id.
95. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 57–59.
96. See id. at 66–67.
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more peaceful lives elsewhere.97 The more promising ones were offered the
chance for more advanced training along with more explicit ties to al Qaeda
as such.98 This process gradually generated a cadre of personnel more di-
rectly responsive to the direction and control of al Qaeda’s senior leader-
ship.99 This development in turn enabled al Qaeda to mount its own
operations, as illustrated by the attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the
9/11 attacks themselves.100
Even in these early years, it would be difficult to map the precise organi-
zational boundaries of al Qaeda. Some key leaders were involved in other
organizations as well,101 raising questions as to whether those organizations
should be understood as independent or not. And al Qaeda had always been
open to the possibility of assisting other groups in conducting operations
suiting the interests of al Qaeda’s senior leadership, which further muddied
the water.102 These complications were relatively manageable circa 2001,
however. At that time, it was perfectly plausible to speak of al Qaeda writ
large as a discrete and identifiable organization, regardless of how much fac-
tual uncertainty there might have been regarding the associational status of
particular persons in relation to the group.103
Things are different today thanks to the complex ways in which al
Qaeda evolved in response to internal and external pressures. The general
thrust of these changes has been to weaken the central organization relative
to an emerging set of regional organizations that may share al Qaeda’s brand
but are not necessarily responsive to its direction and control.104 The combi-
nation is a recipe for uncertainty regarding just what “al Qaeda” means
today.
97. See Staff Statement, Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., Overview of
the Enemy 9–10, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_
statement_15.pdf.
98. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 156–57; see also Omar Nasiri, Inside
the Jihad 134 (2006).
99. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 156–57.
100. See id. at 115–16, 190–91, 248–50.
101. See Wright, supra note 92, at 173.
102. See Bruce Riedel, The Search for al Qaeda (2008); see also Daniel Byman,
Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate Organizations iv (2012),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/7/alqaida%20
terrorism%20byman/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman (“Al-Qa’ida has always been both a
group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not
only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s,
but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essen-
tials.”); Lahoud et al., supra note 5, at 9–10.
103. The 9/11 Commission Report’s depiction of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed’s flirtations
with membership provides an excellent case study of the individual-level uncertainty that
could arise in this era. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 145–50.
104. See Clint Watts, What If There Is No Al-Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism,
Foreign Pol’y Res. Inst. (July 2012), http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.watts.al-
qaeda.pdf; see also Lahoud et al., supra note 5, at 11–12 (“On the operational front . . . the
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Several factors have driven this process of fragmentation. Most obvi-
ously, decentralization to some extent is a matter of survival in the face of
intense and sustained efforts by the United States and its allies to capture or
kill the leaders and members of the core al Qaeda organization. Such efforts
were underway prior to 9/11, with mixed success,105 and the scope and im-
pact of those efforts accelerated dramatically in late 2001. A host of new
policies—including the invasion of Afghanistan, the use of lethal force in
other locations (Yemen, for example, in 2002), the expanded use of rendi-
tion (i.e., capturing an individual and transferring him or her to the custody
of another country), the pressure on allies both to provide intelligence coop-
eration and to use their own authorities to capture and either transfer or
detain suspects, and the use of both criminal prosecution and noncriminal
detention—combined to incapacitate a large number of al Qaeda figures and
drive the remainder much deeper into hiding.106 The bulk of the leadership
apparently sought haven in Pakistan,107 but the eventual expansion of U.S.
kinetic operations to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (“FATA”) com-
bined with an array of other efforts to locate these leaders ultimately made it
extraordinarily difficult for remaining personnel to communicate, let alone
engage in training and operational planning, as illustrated by the extent to
which bin Laden was isolated and the frequency with which subordinate
leaders have been killed.108 The oppressive operational environment—partic-
ularly the constraints on communications that followed from the extraordi-
nary security measures taken to hide key leaders’ locations—ensured that al
Qaeda’s leaders in central Asia would have a limited ability to stay in touch
with, let alone manage the operations of, operatives and cells located else-
where (or even in the Afghanistan–Pakistan area).109
affiliates either did not consult with Bin Ladin or were not prepared to follow his direc-
tives. . . . [T]he framing of an [al Qaeda central] as an organization in control of regional
‘affiliates’ reflects a conceptual construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of
insiders.”).
105. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 111–15.
106. See TSG IntelBrief: Al Qaeda 3.0: An Unfolding Strategy and Threat, Soufan Group
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://soufangroup.com/briefs/details/?Article_Id=357. For a broad-ranging
overview of developments during the first post-9/11 decade, see Peter L. Bergen, The Long-
est War (2011).
107. See Eric Schmitt, Pakistan Deaths Shift Power in Terrorism Network, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/world/asia/al-qaeda-
power-shifting-away-from-pakistan.html.
108. See Klaidman, supra note 1; Sanger, supra note 15; see also Lahoud et al., supra
note 5, at 1 (“Bin Ladin enjoyed little control over either groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida in
name . . . or so-called ‘fellow travelers’ . . . .”). On the penchant for al Qaeda’s operational
leaders to be killed, see Declan Walsh & Eric Schmitt, Al Qaeda’s No. 2 Said to Be Killed in a
Drone Strike, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/
06/world/asia/qaeda-deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all.
109. Al Qaeda correspondence captured during the Abbottabad raid reveals a senior
leadership that was unable to exercise effective control over its affiliates. Lahoud et al., supra
note 5, at 13; see also Soufan Group, supra note 106 (“While a number of senior leaders
remain alive . . . their main goal appears to be primarily survival. Accordingly, the balance of
190 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:163
It is perhaps inevitable that in such circumstances, cells located abroad
might develop their own independent agendas, especially as they draw new
members from indigenous sources. AQAP provides a case study of this as-
pect of fragmentation (as distinct from a separate model, discussed below, in
which a regional “franchise” originates not as an al Qaeda cell but as an
independent, indigenous organization).
AQAP’s story is best understood against the backdrop of operations that
the core al Qaeda organization conducted in Yemen in the late 1990s. Al
Qaeda by that time had developed a substantial operational capacity in its
own right and had turned its eyes to Yemen with the hope of striking an
American military target in an unexpected location; the periodic visits of
U.S. warships to the port of Aden provided a golden opportunity.110 And
although an attack on the USS The Sullivans in 1999 failed, a subsequent
attack on the USS Cole in 2000 did not.111 These attacks demonstrated al
Qaeda’s capacity to operate in Yemen on an ad hoc basis. But aside from a
Yemeni native named Qa’id Salim Talib Sinyan al-Harithi (who was later
killed in a U.S. drone strike), al Qaeda did not appear to maintain a sus-
tained presence in the country at that time.112 As one observer put the point,
the Cole attack “appears to have been more an example of opportunism than
a sign of an enduring al-Qa’ida presence in Yemen.”113
This began to change after the 9/11 attacks. By 2002, a group of Yemeni
men who had been in Afghanistan training with al Qaeda made it out of the
region, returning to Yemen with instructions from al Qaeda to carry out
additional attacks when possible.114 Under the leadership of a Saudi opera-
tive named Fawaz Yahya Hasan al-Rabay’i, this new al Qaeda cell ultimately
carried out a Cole-style bombing on the French vessel M/V Limburg and
then conducted a failed attempt to shoot down a helicopter with a rocket-
propelled grenade.115 After that a long string of arrests crippled the cell, re-
sulting in the imprisonment of al-Rabay’i and dozens of others.116
There things stood for a number of years until a dramatic prison
break—involving a tunnel dug between the prison and a nearby mosque—
power between al-Qaeda central and its affiliates has changed, with the affiliates gaining addi-
tional power and far greater strategic latitude.”); id. (describing the core of al Qaeda as “unable
to offer effective operational guidance, and weakened by the death of senior leaders”).
110. See 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 75, at 190–93.
111. Id. at 180, 190–93.
112. See Combating Terrorism Ctr. at W. Point, A False Foundation? AQAP,
Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen 31–35 (Gabriel Koehler-Derrick ed., 2011) [here-
inafter A False Foundation?], available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-
aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen.
113. Id. at 31.
114. See id. at 33; see also Gregory D. Johnsen, Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Oper-
atives—Part 1, Jamestown Found. Terrorism Monitor (Sept. 27, 2007, 3:34 PM), http://
www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4437&tx_ttnews%5
BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1.
115. A False Foundation?, supra note 112, at 33.
116. See Johnsen, supra note 114.
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resulted in the escape of some two dozen extremists, including not only al-
Rabay’i but also future AQAP leaders Nasir al-Wahayshi and Qasim al-
Raymi.117 Within a year’s time, the escapees proclaimed the formation of a
new organization known as “al-Qa’ida in the Land of Yemen,” which soon
carried out a double suicide bombing targeting an oil facility.118 Many more
attacks followed, some directed at Western targets in Yemen, but many fo-
cused on local government officials and Yemen’s security services and mili-
tary.119 Over time, it became apparent that the new group was developing
substantial indigenous roots and growing ties with tribal leaders in provin-
cial areas already resistant to central government control.120 Name changes
followed as well, with “al-Qa’ida in the Land of Yemen” giving way first to
“al-Qa’ida in the Southern Arabian Peninsula” and then finally—after the
addition to its leadership of two Saudis who had formerly been held at
Guantanamo—it became “al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” or simply
“AQAP.”121
Today, AQAP appears committed to a two-pronged strategy.122 It is first
and foremost committed to fighting a relatively conventional insurgency
against the central government in Yemen and has had considerable success
of late in taking and holding territory toward that end.123 At the same time,
AQAP has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in attacking American and
other Western targets, both within Yemen and externally. The failed attempt
by the so-called “underwear bomber” to take down a flight to Detroit on
Christmas Day 2009 and the failed attempt to set off bombs on two interna-
tional parcel delivery flights in 2010 both testify to this interest in external
operations.124
Bearing all this in mind, is AQAP best understood to be part and parcel
of the original al Qaeda organization or a wholly distinct organization that
simply shares historic ties, branding, goals, and enemies? AQAP is widely
cited as the al Qaeda franchise that remains most closely tied to the core
117. See id.
118. A False Foundation?, supra note 112, at 34.
119. Id. at 37.
120. Id. at 41–45.
121. See id. at 13 n.2, 46–47.
122. See Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism & Intelligence of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 7–8 (2011) (statement of Christopher Boucek, Associate, Carnegie
Endownment [sic] for International Peace), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg72216/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72216.pdf; see also John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President
for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on U.S.
Policy Toward Yemen Council on Foreign Relations (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/307492-1.
123. See, e.g., Bill Roggio, AQAP Kills 17 Yemeni Troops in Southern Yemen, Long War J.
(Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/aqap_kills_17_yemeni.php.
124. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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leadership,125 and we do know that AQAP’s current emir—al Wahayshi—has
publicly pledged bayat to Ayman al Zawahiri, the post–bin Laden leader of
al Qaeda, promising “obedience in good and hard times, in ease and diffi-
culty.”126 We know, too, that bin Laden at one point rejected a request by al
Wahayshi to elevate the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki to a more
senior leadership position within AQAP.127 On the other hand, there is little
evidence that the al Qaeda senior leadership exercised detailed control over
AQAP’s operational activities.128 Absent agreement with respect to just what
conditions suffice to establish that a regional group such as AQAP is part of
the core organization, it is hard to say much more.
Complicating matters, there is a distinct model whereby regional groups
are linked to al Qaeda. Whereas AQAP illustrates the breakaway model of al
Qaeda’s fragmentation, al-Shabaab in Somalia is a case study of a model in
which an indigenous, independent group is gradually brought into the al
Qaeda orbit.
Al Qaeda was not a stranger to East Africa in the pre-9/11 period. On
the contrary, al Qaeda spent its formative years in the Sudan, and even after
bin Laden shifted headquarters to Afghanistan, the group maintained an
operational presence robust enough to carry out the simultaneous bombing
of U.S. embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.129 A substantial num-
ber of al Qaeda operatives remained in the region thereafter, and during the
first post-9/11 decade, other members moved to the area, fleeing the pres-
sure in Pakistan.130 Eventually, al Qaeda attempted to invest this regional
concentration of operatives with a sense of unity, labeling it “al Qaeda in
East Africa” (“AQEA”). Yet AQEA has never acquired much in the way of
organizational coherence, let alone a substantially distinct identity à la
AQAP. The interesting question in East Africa is not whether AQEA is
breaking away from al Qaeda’s senior leadership but instead whether the
indigenous Somali insurgent group known as “al-Shabaab” will merge into
the al Qaeda network to a meaningful degree.
125. See Byman, supra note 102, at 12 (“AQAP has close operational relations with the
al-Qa’ida core.”).
126. Al Wuhayshi’s statement was translated by the SITE Institute. Bill Roggio, AQAP
Leader Pledges Oath of Allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, Long War J. (July 26, 2011), http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/aqap_leader_pledges.php.
127. Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Drone Is Said to Kill Qaeda’s No. 2, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/world/asia/28qaeda.html?_r=
2&ref=markmazzetti.
128. E.g., Gregory D. Johnsen, The Impact of Bin Ladin’s Death on AQAP in Yemen,
CTC Sentinel, May 2011, at 9, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2011/05/CTCSentinel-UBLSI-20114.pdf. For the argument that it is inappropriate to insist on
formal operational control, see Mary Habeck, Answering Objections: Is al Qaeda Really Dead?
Part II, Foreign Pol’y (Apr. 26, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/
04/26/answering_objections_is_al_qaeda_really_dead_part_ii.
129. See Wright, supra note 92.
130. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and
Yemen, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/
world/12terror.html.
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Al-Shabaab originated as the youth wing of a coalition of Somali politi-
cal factions and extremist groups collected under the label the Islamic
Courts Union (“ICU”), which seized control across a wide swath of south-
ern Somalia in 2006.131 An Ethiopian invasion that same year broke the
ICU’s power, which helped trigger al-Shabaab’s emergence as a fully inde-
pendent organization.132 In relatively short order, al-Shabaab managed to
retake much of southern Somalia, mounting a persistent campaign of at-
tacks—including suicide bombings—against Somalia’s transitional govern-
ment in Mogadishu and the African Union peacekeepers that supported it.133
Remarkably, the organization even succeeded in recruiting a number of
young Somali American men from the Minneapolis–St. Paul area—includ-
ing at least one person who later carried out a suicide bombing.134 However,
whether al-Shabaab’s aspirations would remain wholly local became much
less clear over time.
People began to question whether the group had evolved into an al
Qaeda regional franchise, especially after al-Shabaab pulled off a horrific
double suicide bombing in Uganda in 2010, killing about seventy-four peo-
ple including one American.135 The al-Shabaab–al Qaeda tie, however,
proved difficult to pin down for a few reasons. First, there has long been
some amount of “dual-hatting,” meaning that AQEA members have, on an
individual basis, taken on important roles within al-Shabaab’s leadership
structure.136 Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, for example, was both an al Qaeda
131. See Rob Wise, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, Al Shabaab (2011), availa-
ble at http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%
20Study_WEB.pdf; see also Erin Foster-Bowser & Angelia Sanders, Civil-Military Fu-
sion Ctr. Mediterranean Basin Team, Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond 6–9
(2012), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3818.pdf;
Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa’ida Through the Lens of Its Confidential
Secretary 82–84 (2012), available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
CTC-Beware-of-Imitators-June2012.pdf (drawing on translated autobiography of al Qaeda
member Fadil Harun to describe the independent origins of al-Shabaab and the fact that it had
no ties to al Qaeda prior to 2009).
132. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Ethiopian Troops Said to Enter Somalia, Opening New Front
Against Militants, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/11/21/world/africa/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia-witnesses-say.html (describing prior
invasion and its consequences).
133. See id.; Wise, supra note 131, at 7.
134. Andrea Elliott, Charges Detail Road to Terror for 20 in U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24terror.html.
135. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Islamic Militant Group al-Shabab Claims Uganda Bombing
Attacks, Wash. Post, July 12, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071200476.html.
136. E.g., Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern
Somalia, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/
world/africa/15raid.html (“Mr. Nabhan was one of the handful of Qaeda terrorists hiding out
in Somalia for years, taking advantage of the country’s chaos to elude agents pursuing
them. . . . There is increasing evidence that foreign jihadists, like Mr. Nabhan, are leading
Somali Shabab and training them in suicide bombs.”); see also Thomas Joscelyn, Detained UK
Suspect Trained by Shabaab, Long War J. (July 9, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2012/07/detained_uk_suspect.php (discussing Fazul Abdullah Mohammed as both an
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member associated with AQEA and a senior al-Shabaab official.137 Second,
quite apart from ad hoc integration of specific al Qaeda members into its
leadership, al-Shabaab has also long had a substantial number of foreign
fighters within its ranks, and since at least 2008, leaders associated with these
foreign fighters have distinguished themselves from indigenously focused al-
Shabaab leaders by publicly advocating the formal integration of al-Shabaab
into al Qaeda.138 Third, al Qaeda’s senior leaders themselves seem to have
been divided on the question of ties to al-Shabaab.139 All that said, there was
at least a substantial amount of friendly communication underway, with
AQAP leaders apparently playing an important role as both go-betweens and
advocates encouraging al-Shabaab to turn its sights beyond its own
borders.140
The prospect of merger gained considerable ground in February 2012,
when a key al-Shabaab leader appeared in a video to announce al-Shabaab’s
formal accession to the al Qaeda network; the video included a clip of
Ayman al Zawahiri himself welcoming al-Shabaab aboard.141 Whether the
video truly spoke for al-Shabaab as a whole, however—and whether the link
will involve actual subordination of al-Shabaab to al Qaeda or even the sort
of cooperative relationship that may exist between AQAP and al Qaeda—
remains to be seen. An al-Shabaab figure long associated with al Shabaab’s
foreign forces made the pronouncement, and that wing had made similar
statements of allegiance to al Qaeda in the past.142 Other al-Shabaab leaders
have previously expressed reluctance to being drawn in to al Qaeda’s larger
global orientation, however, lest they lose focus on their ambitions for
AQEA leader and an al-Shabaab commander); Bill Roggio, British Shabaab Operative Killed in
Airstrike in Somalia, Long War J. (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2012/01/british_shabaab_oper.php (describing drone strike against Bilal al Berjawi and depict-
ing al Berjawi as an al Qaeda member who had been second in command of AQEA while also
functioning as a leader of al-Shabaab).
137. See Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 136. On the raid that killed Nabhan, see
Klaidman, supra note 1, at 122–27.
138. See Bill Roggio, Moroccan Jihadist Killed in Somalia Airstrike, Long War J. (Feb.
24, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/moroccan_jihadist.php (reporting
attack on Moroccan extremist who had been part of al-Shabaab and an advocate of merger
with al Qaeda); Edmund Sanders, Conditions May Be Ripe for al Qaeda to Gain in Somalia,
L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/25/world/fg-
shabab25.
139. Compare Lahoud et al., supra note 5, at 41 (suggesting division), with Brian
Bennett, Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says, L.A. Times, July 18,
2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-
20110718 (suggesting interest on the part of al Qaeda’s leadership).
140. Bennett, supra note 139.
141. See Nelly Lahoud, The Merger of Al-Shabab and Qa’idat al-Jihad, CTC Sentinel,
Feb. 2012, at 1–2, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CTC-
Sentinel-Vol5Iss24.pdf.
142. See id.
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Somalia (and lest they draw unwanted attention from Western security ser-
vices).143 At the time of this writing, then, the most that can be said is that
AQAP appears to be more closely connected to al Qaeda than does al-
Shabaab, but the gap may be shrinking.
There are many other examples of al Qaeda’s fragmentation, most of
them similar to the al-Shabaab model of an independent group moving into
al Qaeda’s orbit to some indeterminate and unstable degree. Al Qaeda has
been linked in relatively unspecified ways to a group of Islamist extremists in
northern Nigeria known as Boko Haram.144 The Algerian extremist group
formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat has embraced the
al Qaeda brand more formally, becoming “al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”
or “AQIM,” and has recently seized territory in northern Mali working in
close concert with a local armed group of extremists known as Ansar Dine
(“Defenders of the Faith”).145 Multiple groups linked to al Qaeda have
emerged in the area of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, including groups like
Ansar al Jihad146 and one calling itself the Mujahideen Shura Council.147 Iraq
notoriously became the home of al Qaeda in Iraq (“AQI”) in the years fol-
lowing the U.S. invasion. AQI proved very reluctant to conform its opera-
tions to the dictates of al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan in its first
iteration; after nearly being eliminated a few years ago, however, it is now
enjoying a substantial resurgence.148 And as the civil war in Syria unfolds, an
al Qaeda–linked group known as Jabhat al-Nursah has become increasingly
prominent, though whether the group is best understood as part of AQI or
143. Bennett, supra note 139; see also Will McCants, A Tangled Net Assessment of al-
Qaeda, Jihadica (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.jihadica.com/a-net-assessment-of-al-qaeda/
(“[I]t is not clear that the entire organization has agreed with the al-Qaeda merger.”).
144. David Blair, Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Boko Haram’s Deadly Nigerian Attacks, Tele-
graph, Feb. 5, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9062825/Al-
Qaedas-hand-in-Boko-Harams-deadly-Nigerian-attacks.html; Dina Temple-Raston, Al-Qaida
Arm in Yemen Flexes Its Muscles in Nigeria, npr (July 12, 2012, 3:07 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2012/07/12/156641658/al-qaida-arm-in-yemen-flexes-its-muscles-in-nigeria; see also Foster-
Bowser & Sanders, supra note 131, at 4–6 (providing background information on Boko
Haram).
145. Bruce Riedel, The New Al Qaeda Menace, Nat’l Int. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://
nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-new-al-qaeda-menace-7305; see also Foster-Bowser &
Sanders, supra note 131, at 2–3.
146. Bill Roggio, Ansar al Jihad Swears Allegiance to al Qaeda’s Emir, Long War J. (Jan.
24, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/ansar_al_jihad_swear.php.
147. Ibrahim Barzak, Shadowy al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Israel Attack, Wash.
Times, June 19, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/19/shadowy-al-qaeda-
linked-group-claims-israel-attack/?page=all; Bill Roggio, Mujahideen Shura Council Calls At-
tack in Israel a ‘Gift’ to Zawahiri and al Qaeda ‘Brothers’, Long War J. (July 30, 2012), http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/07/egyptian_jihadist_gr.php.
148. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, 15 City Officials Quit in Iraq, Citing Threat from Al Qaeda,
N.Y. Times, July 28, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/world/
middleeast/15-iraqi-officials-in-baquba-quit-in-protest-over-qaeda-threat.html?_r=1&gwh=6
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as an independent entity is in dispute.149 Each of these groups may differ
markedly from one another in terms of (1) their actual degree of connection
to al Qaeda itself, (2) their interest in conducting operations against Ameri-
can or other Western targets outside the confines of the state in which they
usually operate, and (3) their own organizational coherence.150
Extreme decentralization receives a further nudge from certain influen-
tial theorists of jihad—most notably Abu Musab al-Suri—who advocate for
a radically decentralized model in which there is little to no hierarchy or
connectivity among participants and instead simply an inspirational vision
that would lead large numbers of individuals or small groups to form and
take action on their own initiative.151 They would be members of a move-
ment, one might say, but not of any particular organization. This model—
familiar in the United States as the “leaderless resistance” approach, and
popularized in particular by Marc Sageman as the “leaderless jihad” con-
cept—maximizes operational security, as it is impossible to unravel a net-
work after identifying one or more key nodes when there is no network.152
Notwithstanding these pressures and theories, the drive to decentralize
might have amounted to relatively little if there had not been havens to
149. See, e.g., Seth G. Jones, Op-Ed., Al Qaeda’s War for Syria, Wall St. J., July 26,
2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904433437045775512815307
82466.html; Thomas Joscelyn, Al Nusrah Front Leader Renews Allegiance to al Qaeda, Rejects
New Name, Long War Journal, Apr. 10, 2013, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2013/04/al_nusrah_front_lead.php; Neil MacFarquhar & Hwaida Saad, Jihadists Tak-
ing a Growing Role in Syrian Revolt, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2012, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/world/middleeast/as-syrian-war-drags-on-jihad-gains-foothold
.html?_r=1&hp; Ed Husain, Al Qaeda’s Specter in Syria, Posting to First Take, Council on
Foreign Rel. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/syria/al-qaedas-specter-syria/p28782?cid=rss-
terrorism-al_qaeda_s_specter_in_syria-080612&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed
&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ssue%2Fterrorism+%28CFR.org+-+Issues+-+Terrorism%29&
utm_content=Google+Reader; Dina Temple-Raston, U.S. Sees Signs of Al-Qaida Arm in Syria,
npr (Aug. 3, 2012, 4:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/03/157932381/u-s-sees-signs-of-al-
qaida-arm-in-syria.
150. Cf. Byman, supra note 102, at 32–37. As to that last point, note that some of these
groups have internally embraced a relatively decentralized command structure. Retired Gen-
eral Stanley McChrystal, who commanded JSOC from 2003 to 2008, noted this reality in a
much discussed 2011 article in which he commented that traditional organizational models
failed to account for the decentralized network structure of al Qaeda in Iraq, which amounted
to “a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but on the basis of relationships and
acquaintances, reputation and fame.” Stanley A. McChrystal, It Takes a Network, Foreign
Pol’y, March/April 2011, at 66, 68, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/
02/22/it_takes_a_network?page=full.
151. See, e.g., U.S. Naval Inst., A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad (Jim Lacey ed.,
2008) (providing an abridged English translation of al-Suri’s Da’wat al-muqawamah al-is-
lamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, or “Call to Global Islamic Resistance”).
152. See Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad 140–46 (2008). Of course, the model can
only work if potential participants are actually exposed to information that would suffice to
inspire them to action, as well as to enough expertise (regarding tactical method, creation of
explosives, and so forth) to enable them to act effectively; the internet is particularly useful on
this dimension, and this is a major reason why the leaderless resistance model is more likely to
find traction today than in decades past.
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which at least some al Qaeda personnel could disperse (or remain in place,
for those situations where an al Qaeda member was already present) and
regions with indigenous, like-minded organizations to which al Qaeda
might establish ties. In fact, both were available. Ungoverned areas—or, at
least, areas beyond the writ of central governments—turned out to exist not
only in the FATA of Pakistan but also in a number of provinces in Yemen,
wide swaths of Somalia, and northern Mali.153 Each of these areas had indig-
enous populations hostile to some degree to their respective central govern-
ments and inclined both theologically and politically to sympathize actively
with al Qaeda, or at least to tolerate the presence of groups espousing al
Qaeda’s viewpoint.154 And in each of these areas there was no shortage of
existing armed groups. The emergence of civil war in Syria may well be
producing a similar opportunity.155
In summary, al Qaeda has fragmented along several dimensions. Its core
personnel have dispersed geographically, making it more difficult to deter-
mine whether a particular individual is in fact part of al Qaeda. At the same
time, it has embraced (willfully or not) a model in which its own regional
cells are increasingly independent while simultaneously seeking nominal or
loose ties to existing independent regional actors. The widely varying nature
of these groups’ relationship to al Qaeda’s senior leadership makes it exceed-
ingly difficult (particularly without access to the best intelligence) to say
which of these groups are part of al Qaeda itself, which are independent yet
allied in some meaningful fashion with al Qaeda, and which are merely in
sympathetic communication with al Qaeda but are not in any real sense
subject to its direction and control.
Making matters more complicated still, the original al Qaeda organiza-
tion may be on the brink of complete collapse due to a number of factors
including the extraordinary success that the United States and its allies have
had in killing or capturing its key leaders. In addition, al Qaeda has suffered
a body blow to its popularity as a result of (1) growing public appreciation
for the number of Muslims killed by its operations and those of its
cobranded affiliates and (2) the increased profile of an alternative path to
political change in the Sunni Arab world made manifest in the Arab Spring
movement and its various component revolutions.156 At some point, the core
153. See Stewart M. Patrick, Are ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ a Threat?, Council on Foreign
Rel. (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/ungoverned-spaces-threat/p21165 (arguing
for a nuanced view of the problem posed by ungoverned spaces in general).
154. See id.; see also A False Foundation?, supra note 112; Dan Merica, Defense Offi-
cial: U.S. Needs to ‘Accelerate’ Effort to Help Mali, CNN (July 26, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/us/mali-terror-concerns/index.html.
155. See, e.g., MacFarquhar and Saad, supra note 149.
156. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Panetta: U.S. ‘Within Reach’ of Defeating al-Qaeda, Wash.
Post, July 9, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/panetta-us-within-
reach-of-defeating-al-qaeda/2011/07/09/gIQAvPpG5H_story.html; Fawaz A. Gerges, How the
Arab Spring Beat Al Qaeda, Daily Beast (May 13, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/13/fawaz-a-gerges-on-how-the-arab-spring-beat-al-
qaeda.html. But see Seth G. Jones, Think Again: Al Qaeda, Foreign Pol’y, May/June 2012, at
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may well be gone altogether, leaving no “al Qaeda” to which the regional
groups could be connected.157 Even if the core survives, however, its decline
relative to the operational significance and independence of the “franchises”
makes it ever less sensible—ever more dated—to view the overall situation
through a core-centric lens.
2. The Legal Consequences of Proliferation and Fragmentation
The proliferation and fragmentation trends described above create a
growing disconnect between the conception of the enemy embedded in the
existing domestic legal architecture and the facts on the ground. The 2001
AUMF, though framed in general terms, was relatively straightforward in
terms of identifying an enemy. It encompassed al Qaeda in its reference to
the organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and it encompassed the
Afghan Taliban in its reference to those who might harbor the organization
responsible for the 9/11 attacks. It said no more and no less and thus set the
stage for a two-party conception of the enemy.
Bush himself challenged that conception early on in a speech to Con-
gress, proclaiming that the War on Terror would not be limited to al Qaeda
but would extend to all terrorist organizations of global reach threatening
America.158 Such a capacious understanding of the enemy was beyond what
Congress had provided in the AUMF, and thus the speech raised the ques-
tion of whether military force against additional groups might instead be
justified domestically (i.e., in terms of the separation of powers) on grounds
of inherent presidential power to use force under Article II of the Constitu-
tion (either as a matter of national self-defense or on some broader theory
of executive discretion to use force to further the national interest).159 But,
though subsequent rhetoric often referred to a “Global War on Terror”
rather than a conflict with al Qaeda as such, the matter eventually came to
seem rather academic, as it did not appear that the United States was actu-
ally detaining or targeting persons outside the al Qaeda–Afghan Taliban
47, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/think_again_al_qaeda?
page=full (arguing that reports of al Qaeda’s demise are premature).
157. Cf. Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda Targets Dwindle as Group Shrinks, Wash. Post, Nov. 22,
2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaeda-targets-
dwindle-as-group-shrinks/2011/11/22/gIQAbXJNmN_story.html. A similar shift could well
occur vis-à-vis the Taliban, in the event of a peace agreement in Afghanistan.
158. Bush, supra note 79, at 1348; see also Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Counter-
strike 25 (2011) (describing post-9/11 debate within the Bush Administration with respect to
“how precisely to define the enemy beyond Al Qaeda”).
159. See Memorandum Opinion for the Att’y Gen. from Caroline D. Krass, Principal
Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf; Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.,
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Author-
ity for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23,
2001), http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf.
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framework.160 The emerging detention case law powerfully reinforces this
perception as the vast bulk of cases involved persons that the government
said were members of al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban.161 The fact that the
Obama Administration expressly invoked authority only under the AUMF
further reinforced the apparent primacy of the two-party conception.162
All of which would be fine from the domestic separation-of-powers per-
spective, except that in reaction to the proliferation and fragmentation
trends described above, the United States eventually did begin using force
against members of other groups after all—or at least it began using force in
situations which could not be reconciled with the two-party conception
without encountering difficult factual questions about the precise nature of
the link between a given group and al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban. This
occurred on a widespread and sustained scale in Afghanistan itself and in
Pakistan;163 it occurred on a narrower and more episodic scale in Yemen in
relation to AQAP;164 and it may or may not have occurred from time to time
in Somalia, depending on whether one thinks that episodic uses of force
there have targeted al-Shabaab as such or, instead, individuals linked to the
core al Qaeda organization.165
The executive branch has long argued that any such extensions remain
justified from a domestic law perspective on the theory that the AUMF im-
plicitly includes authority to use force against any entities that emerge as
cobelligerents of al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban—a status the executive
branch refers to as becoming an “associated force.”166 This approach began
in the Bush Administration, which built the associated forces model into its
description of the boundaries of its detention authority in the course of the
Guantanamo habeas litigation.167 The Obama Administration has continued
this approach, both in litigation and in its National Strategy for
Counterterrorism.168
160. See supra Section II.B; see also John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Address to the London School of Economics on Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism 8
(Oct. 31, 2006), http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf (“We do
not believe that we are in a legal state of war with every terrorist group everywhere in the
world. Rather, the United States uses the term ‘global war on terrorism’ to mean that all
countries must strongly oppose, and must fight against, terrorism in all its forms, everywhere
around the globe. . . . We do, however, believe that we are in a legal state of armed conflict
with al Qaida, for the reasons I have already described.”).
161. See supra Section II.B.
162. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Section III.A.
164. See supra Section III.A.
165. See Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 136; Roggio, supra note 136.
166. See Chesney, supra note 32, at 788–93.
167. See id.
168. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House 3 & n.1 (June 28, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; see also Chesney,
supra note 32, at 830–31.
200 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:163
There are two problems with the associated-forces solution. First, some
critics deny that the cobelligerency concept has application in this setting,
reasoning that cobelligerency is a creature of international law applicable
solely in the context of international armed conflict—a circumstance not
present here.169 Whatever the merits of that criticism in the abstract, how-
ever, it became irrelevant to the domestic law separation-of-powers dispute
(i.e., the fight as to whether Congress had implicitly authorized the use of
force against “associated forces” or if the president may have such power
through Article II in the alternative) when Congress in 2011 enacted the
NDAA FY12, which included language expressly embracing the executive
branch’s detention-authority definition—encompassing not just al Qaeda
and the Taliban but also “associated forces.”170 It is thus no longer necessary
to argue that such a concept should be read into the AUMF via cobelliger-
ency; Congress has expressly embraced the general idea.
But what exactly counts as an associated force? This is the second prob-
lem, and not only does it remain untouched by the NDAA FY12 but it is also
a problem that is growing increasingly serious as the trends described above
unfold. Simply put, it is not clear what criteria apply to identify a group as
an associated force.
International law is little help, even if we were to accept the relevance of
the cobelligerency concept, given the distance between the organizations and
networks currently at issue and the state-centric situations that gave rise to
that concept in the past. Congress missed the chance to address this issue in
the NDAA FY12, choosing to simply codify the “associated forces” concept
without defining it. The habeas-derived case law from the past decade also
has little to offer. As noted above, those cases almost invariably involve per-
sons linked either to the Afghan Taliban or to the core al Qaeda organization
(or more specifically, to the training camps and recruiting pipelines that al
Qaeda operated pre-9/11). Such fact patterns spare the courts any need to
grapple with the nuances that situations like that of Warsame present (i.e.,
those that are replete with uncertainty regarding various groups and their
ties to al Qaeda).
Here we might add, too, a note on the impact of the sheer passage of
time. In some quarters, a tipping point has arrived. Nothing captures this
sense better—or more relevantly—than the blunt denunciation issued by
Christopher Heyns—designated by a United Nations body to be a “special
rapporteur” monitoring the practice of “extrajudicial killing”—at an event
sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) in the summer
of 2012. According to the account provided by the Guardian,
169. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict
with Al-Qaeda, and It’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 Tex. Int’l L.J. 115, 125–30
(2011); Gabor Rona, Targeted Killing: A Response to Michael Lewis, Opinio Juris (July 30,
2012, 11:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/07/30/gabor-rona-on-targeted-killing-a-
response-to-michael-lewis/. But see Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the
War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 42–46 (2011).
170. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
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Heyns ridiculed the US suggestion that targeted UAV strikes on al-Qaida or
allied groups were a legitimate response to the 9/11 attacks. “It’s difficult to
see how any killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to
[events] in 2001,” he said. “Some states seem to want to invent new laws to
justify new practices.”171
* * *
In his recent depiction of the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism
policies, journalist Daniel Klaidman offers the following account of the pres-
ident’s appreciation for the growing legal instability. The president, he ob-
served, was
a lawyer, and he understood that in the shadow wars, far from conven-
tional battlefields, the United States was operating further out on the mar-
gins of the law. Ten years after 9/11, the military was taking the fight to
terrorist groups that didn’t exist when Congress granted George Bush au-
thority to go to war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Complicated ques-
tions about which groups and individuals were covered under the [AUMF]
were left to the lawyers. Their finely grained distinctions and hair-splitting
legal arguments could mean the difference between who would be killed
and who would be spared.172
That passage perfectly captures the legal impact of al Qaeda’s evolution.
It also turns our attention to a second disruptive strategic shift: that on the
part of the U.S. government as it moves away from overt combat deploy-
ments and toward discrete, low-visibility uses of force.
B. Strategic Change and the U.S. Government’s Shift to Shadow War
Legal destabilization is not just a matter of al Qaeda’s evolution and
consequent uncertainty as to the identity of the enemy. It also flows from a
long-term shift in the U.S. government’s approach to the disposition of its
own forces, a shift in strategy that Klaidman writes is “firmly in line with
Obama’s approach to the war on terror: surgical and discrete.”173 Specifi-
cally, the United States is drawing down in Afghanistan while simultane-
ously expanding its involvement in what might best be described as “shadow
war.” The end result will be something altogether new in our experience: a
171. Owen Bowcott, Drone Strikes Threaten 50 Years of International Law, Says U.N.
Rapporteur, Guardian, June 21, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/drone-
strikes-international-law-un.
172. Klaidman, supra note 1, at 205. Klaidman’s book details several instances in
which lawyers and officials engaged in sharp internal debates with respect to whether it would
be proper to engage in strikes against targets in Somalia, sometimes turning on points of law,
sometimes points of policy, and sometimes points of evidentiary assessment. See, e.g., id. at
49–51 (describing rejection of a proposed operation targeting both an unidentified high-value
target and an al-Shabaab training camp).
173. Id. at 205; see also id. at 120 (“[T]he [CIA]’s operational capabilities [a]re well
suited to [Obama’s] strategic goal—taking high-ranking al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives off
the battlefield while shrinking America’s footprint in the region.”); id. at 121 (describing
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formally secret yet partially transparent set of institutions and programs en-
gaged in the use of lethal force and other military-style counterterrorism
measures on a systematic basis (including both direct action by low-visibility
U.S. forces and support for operations conducted by other governments) yet
wholly delinked from any contemporaneous circumstance of undisputed
armed conflict. In that setting, the persistent disagreement as to when and
where LOAC governs simply cannot be ignored.
1. Step One: Drawdown in Afghanistan
The United States has maintained a large-scale combat presence in Af-
ghanistan for more than a decade, and as recently as 2009 the main focus of
debate in Washington concerned the size of the troop surge that circum-
stances there warranted.174 But things are different today. No one speaks of
outright victory over the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents, let alone
generational commitments to achieve that end. The White House has re-
portedly embraced considerably more modest goals, embodied by the slogan
“Afghan Good Enough.”175 Drawdown is no longer an abstract possibility
but a policy reality with a specific timeline. The transition of security re-
sponsibility to Afghan forces is already well on its way, with the goal of
completion in 2014.176 In sum, large-scale U.S. involvement in the war in
Afghanistan is coming to a close, much as occurred in Iraq a few years
previously.177
There are many reasons for this policy shift. As an initial matter, the
U.S. government faces tremendous budget pressure and likely will for many
years to come. This pressure is due to a number of factors, such as the long
period of recession and stagnation in the U.S. domestic economy following
the collapse of the housing bubble, long-running imbalances in the federal
Obama and CIA Director Leon Panetta as viewing “the drone program as a potential strategic
game-changer in the war on terror”).
174. See Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (2010).
175. Sanger, supra note 15, at 49–51.
176. Helene Cooper & Matthew Rosenberg, NATO Agrees on Afghan Security Transition
in 2013, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2012, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/
world/nato-formally-agrees-to-transition-on-afghan-security.html?pagewanted=all&r=2&;
Helene Cooper & Eric Schmitt, Officials in U.S. Debate Speeding Afghan Pullout, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 13, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/world/asia/us-officials-
debate-speeding-up-afghan-pullout.html?pagewanted=all&r=1.
177. Hostilities in Afghanistan could of course continue or even worsen after the Amer-
ican drawdown, and it is possible that U.S. forces could continue to participate in more limited
ways in that fighting. The important point, however, is that the reduced scale and changed
nature of lingering American involvement will likely raise serious questions as to whether the
United States remains a party to an armed conflict there, very much akin to the questions that
exist today in relation to U.S. involvement in hostilities in Yemen. Even if the better answer to
such questions is that an armed conflict does still exist and the United States is still a party to
it, there is no question that the matter will be far more disputed than it currently is.
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budget, an apparent political impasse with respect to serious reform of enti-
tlement spending, and financial and monetary instability abroad (particu-
larly in the Eurozone). Collectively, these circumstances and others create
extraordinary pressure to save money where possible, including in the de-
fense and foreign affairs budgets. That is true of the formal, recurring de-
fense budget and certainly of the kinds of supplemental appropriations that
the U.S. government routinely needed in the past to fund operations in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. The public’s willingness to support expenditures in Af-
ghanistan is eroding, moreover, due to periodic reports of wasteful spending
there, such as a recent inspector general’s report, which concluded that hun-
dreds of millions of dollars spent on infrastructure projects have not only
fueled local corruption and led to waste but may actually prove
counterproductive.178
Other factors reinforce the fiscal pressure. The American public appears
increasingly weary of overseas combat deployments and attendant casualties.
Public support for continuing a U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan reached
an all-time low in April 2012, according to a Pew Research Center poll, with
59% of “swing voters” (constituting 23% of all registered voters) favoring
withdrawal as soon as possible and even 48% of committed Romney voters
taking the same view (65% of committed Obama voters took this view as
well).179 Barring a catalyzing event such as a major terrorist attack on the
homeland, there is no reason to expect that trend to reverse in the near
future. Diplomatic factors pull in the same direction as our allies one by one
withdraw from the field in the face of their own fiscal and political
constraints.180
A variety of policy considerations play their part as well. Some might
argue, for example, that large-scale combat deployments are ultimately
counterproductive in that the presence of U.S. forces may give rise to more
problems than it solves. Path dependency also matters here, as progress
along the path to withdrawal at some point becomes irreversible in the face
of mounting diplomatic, financial, and domestic political costs that might
follow from a reversal of course; indeed, it may be that relations with the
Karzai Administration and the various neighboring states on which the
United States depends for trans-shipment of resources simply preclude a
178. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Construction Projects in Afghanistan Challenged by
Inspector General’s Report, Wash. Post, July 30, 2012, available at http://articles.washington
post.com/2012-07-30/world/35487571_1_taliban-insurgency-afghan-government-afghanistan.
179. Most Swing Voters Favor Afghan Troop Withdrawal, Pew Res. Ctr. for People &
Press 1 (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-18-12%20
Afghanistan%20Release2.pdf.
180. See, e.g., James Kirkup, NATO Sets ‘Irreversible’ Roadmap to Withdrawing Troops
from Afghanistan, Telegraph, May 22, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/afghanistan/9281562/Nato-sets-irreversible-roadmap-to-withdrawing-troops-from-
Afghanistan.html (noting French plans to withdraw by the end of 2012 and NATO plans to
shift to a solely supporting role by mid-2013, with complete withdrawal scheduled for the end
of 2014).
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reversal at this stage.181 And though there is talk of a continued U.S. military
presence in Afghanistan going forward, supported by a strategic partnership
agreement that loosely envisions such collaboration, remaining forces are
likely to concentrate on a background role involving training and other
forms of support to the Afghan government; to the extent U.S. forces do
engage in direct action there in the future, it will likely involve the same low-
intensity “shadow war” model discussed below.182
In sum, it seems unlikely that the United States will continue to engage
in large-scale combat operations in Afghanistan beyond 2014. As a conse-
quence, there will soon be no circumstance in which it is undisputed both
that there is an armed conflict and that the United States is a party. This
state of affairs will have significant legal consequences. Before discussing
these consequences, however, it is important to account for a closely related
development: America’s increasing reliance on shadow war.
2. Step Two: Increased Emphasis on Shadow War
At precisely the same time that the United States is reducing its involve-
ment in large-scale, overt combat operations, it is increasingly making use of
warlike methods—including the use of lethal force and military detention—
in episodic, low-intensity circumstances in which the U.S. role is meant to
be secret or at least not formally acknowledged. This is what I mean by the
“shadow war” model.
The shadow war approach to counterterrorism is not a novelty. On the
contrary, it has roots going back at least to the early 1980s and has been in
181. See, e.g., Simon Long, Afghanistan: Too Close for Comfort, Economist (Special Re-
port: Pakistan), Feb. 11, 2012, at 5–6, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21546892
(detailing Pakistan’s closure of ISAF supply routes in response to an American drone strike). It
is difficult to say how much partisan political calculation also matters in this mix. It is easy to
generalize, asserting that the Obama Administration has something to gain vis-à-vis its base by
withdrawing from Afghanistan (and avoiding large-scale deployments to any new settings) and
that a hypothetical Romney Administration would have had the opposite political incentives.
But the reality may be more complicated. A combination of Tea Party–inspired emphasis on
fiscal constraint, realist-inspired skepticism about the efficacy of large-scale deployments, and
libertarian-inspired concerns about the growth of the national security state and America’s
role in global affairs has infused Republican politics with crosscurrents that make such assess-
ments difficult. The Democratic Party contains multitudes as well, including advocates of
armed humanitarian intervention and persons and groups committed to the welfare of Af-
ghans who may suffer postwithdrawal (particularly Afghan women). In an era in which inde-
pendent voters often hold the balance of power, it is not obvious that politicians running for
national office are best served in the general election by playing to their bases. All of which
suggests that political calculations will play out in idiosyncratic ways.
182. On the strategic partnership for the future, see Press Release, Office of the White
House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (May 1,
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-
afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement. On the shift toward a shadow war model for Af-
ghanistan postdrawdown, see Greg Miller, CIA Digs in as Americans Withdraw from Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/cia-digs-in-as-americans-withdraw-from-iraq-afghanistan/2012/02/07/gIQ
AFNJTxQ_story.html.
November 2013] Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda 205
use continually in relation to al Qaeda since the 1990s. But it is different
today in three respects. It has become far more capable, thanks to robust
institutionalization, resourcing, and technological progress. It has become
far more central to counterterrorism strategy, thanks to the trends described
above (the fragmentation of the enemy and the many pressures cutting
against reliance on overt means). And it has become far more exposed to
public scrutiny, thanks to the emerging climate of compelled transparency
surrounding government action (including the avalanche of purposeful gov-
ernment leaks that help make articles like this possible in the first place).
a. A Thumbnail Sketch of the Origins of the Shadow War
The seminal moment for the shadow war model arguably occurred in
1983.183 A rash of bombings and kidnappings in Lebanon presented the
White House with a dilemma. The option of striking back at the responsible
parties (or their state sponsors) with overt military force, such as a sustained
air strike campaign, faced a host of practical, political, and diplomatic obsta-
cles, not to mention resistance from Pentagon leaders steeped in the notion
from Vietnam that there is no such thing as the surgical use of military
force. The circumstances favored covert means, then, but whether that could
include the use of deadly force generated substantial internal debate. Viet-
nam was not the only recent event influencing attitudes, after all. The 1970s
also witnessed a series of revelations concerning CIA plots to kill various
foreign leaders. The Ford Administration responded by adopting an execu-
tive order prohibiting assassination, and both Presidents Carter and Reagan
followed suit. The general counsel of the CIA ultimately determined, how-
ever, that the use of lethal force for counterterrorism purposes was a differ-
ent kettle of fish, paving the way for Reagan to authorize the CIA to develop
a proxy force of foreign personnel capable of killing terrorism-related
targets. Ultimately, the plan foundered due to the apparently poor quality of
the team the CIA recruited, but the underlying authority remained in place,
as did the legal framework pursuant to which the use of lethal force against
terrorism threats was conceived not to be assassination but, rather, an act of
lawful self-defense.
When the emergence of al Qaeda caused terrorism concerns to spike
again in the 1990s, the circumstances once more favored reliance on covert
and clandestine methods (at least with respect to threats lying beyond the
reach of the American criminal justice system). This pressure resulted first in
the rendition program undertaken during the Clinton Administration,
which sought to incapacitate individual terrorists by putting them in the
custody of their own governments. Then, as the threat mounted, the Clinton
Administration turned back to the Reagan model and authorities relating to
covert lethal force. As before, the prospect generated intense disagreements,
183. The following account derives from Robert Chesney, Military–Intelligence Conver-
gence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 539, 549–63
(2012).
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and as a result, the precise extent to which covert lethal force was authorized
both varied over time and was subject to much misunderstanding. Still, cov-
ert lethal force was authorized to some extent. Initially, it focused once more
on the use of proxy forces, though there were hopes early on that technol-
ogy—in the form of an armed drone—might at last provide the United
States with the capacity to kill in denied areas without relying on proxy
forces or putting its own personnel in danger.
After the East African embassy bombings of 1998, the Clinton Adminis-
tration broke new ground by adding an overt military track to the existing
shadow war model, embodied in the launch of cruise missiles at al
Qaeda–linked targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan (and in the preservation
of the same launch option thereafter in the event that the administration
could obtain actionable intelligence). This development in theory could have
generated a sustained public debate regarding what it meant to go to war
against a nonstate actor and how the law of war—LOAC—ought to apply in
such circumstances. But it did not. The public did not know about the
shadow war elements, and the one episode of overt military force proved to
be insufficient to spark such a debate; a momentary flash of lethal force
compares poorly to the slow boil of military detention when it comes to
generating sustained debate, it seems.
After 9/11, things changed. The overt military track was no longer a
marginal part of the policy but rather the elephant in the room, even with
the simultaneous expansion of the shadow war; the invasion of Afghanistan
and the creation of a long-term military detention system at Guantanamo
drew the vast bulk of attention. The expansion of shadow war operations
against al Qaeda did draw some attention, particularly in connection with
rendition and interrogation. But in the nature of things, the expansion of
the shadow war was not nearly so widely appreciated or understood, at least
not at the time. Simply put, the visible and dramatic expansion of the overt
military track during the first post-9/11 decade largely eclipsed the simulta-
neous expansion of the shadow war.
b. Why the Shadow War Is Becoming Dominant
Why is the shadow war aspect of U.S. counterterrorism policy growing
again at the very moment when the overt military track is in decline? As an
initial matter, as described above, the core al Qaeda organization is giving
way, in fits and starts, to a set of regional actors who have no particular ties
to the Afghan theater and may well have only the most formal ties to al
Qaeda’s remaining senior leadership. In practical terms, that means that
U.S. counterterrorism operations will increasingly focus on places like
Yemen and Somalia. At the same time, the decline of overt combat opera-
tions in Afghanistan will have the effect of converting that location into
something more akin to what today exists in Yemen and Somalia: a venue
for shadow war operations. The pressures described above, militating against
sustained combat operations, will push counterterrorism policy into the
shadows in these locations. The more politically difficult it is to pursue the
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overt option, the more comparatively attractive it becomes to pursue covert
or other secret means; if the latter are more affordable financially and less
abrasive diplomatically, so much the better.
Next, consider the centrality of technological change to all this. As noted
above, the idea of using lethal force covertly once depended on putting spe-
cific persons in harm’s way. If the government was unwilling to put Ameri-
cans at risk, it had to act through local proxy forces, with all the risk that
entailed—including the risk of sheer inefficacy. Technological change has
utterly disrupted this calculus, creating unprecedented opportunities for
projecting lethal force without reliance on proxies and with relatively little
risk to U.S. personnel. Specifically, advances in drone technologies—from
armed, unmanned aerial vehicles like the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9
Reaper to an array of stealthy surveillance devices—have given the United
States an unprecedented capacity to project force into areas where it has no
sustained deployments of ground forces.184 Projecting force in such areas
with reduced personal risk previously required reliance on alternatives such
as cruise missiles or manned aircraft sorties (although the latter certainly
involved personal risk if the denied area had serious air defense capabili-
ties).185 These were not always attractive options for commanders and
policymakers because of the long lag time between the decision to strike and
the actual moment of impact, as well as concerns about the precision of
these platforms in terms of the accuracy of the resulting attack. Manned
aircrafts, moreover, generally require plausible search-and-rescue capacities
that might further deter their use in the first place. The extraordinary expan-
sion of drones’ capacities and numbers from the pre-9/11 period to the pre-
sent has a game-changing impact on what the United States can accomplish
on the shadow war track (although it is true, to be sure, that drones are far
more effective insofar as they rest on a foundation of intelligence-collection
that may require a substantial amount of human intelligence (“HUMINT”)).
The days of depending on long-range Tomahawk missile strikes to carry out
lethal operations seem impossibly distant—and impossibly constraining,
comparatively speaking.
Another key enabling factor is the extent to which the shadow war
model has been institutionalized and thereby entrenched. An array of devel-
opments in both the military and intelligence communities have created a
sustainable and rather impressive capacity for conducting a broad spectrum
of covert and clandestine counterterrorism operations. These developments
include a vast expansion of the authorities, budget, manpower, and other
JSOC resources, as well as corresponding changes in the CIA (including, for
example, a sweeping conversion of the workforce into targeting-related roles
184. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 58; Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, CIA Plans
Yemen Drone Strikes, Wall St. J., June 14, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052702303848104576384051572679110.html; David Axe, Hidden History: America’s
Secret Drone War in Africa, Wired (Aug. 13, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/danger
room/2012/08/somalia-drones/all/.
185. See Axe, supra note 184.
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and the acquisition of a veritable drone air force).186 They also include a
remarkable amount of cooperation between the military and the CIA, both
in the field and at the back-office level; in some contexts it may be more
accurate to speak of JSOC and CIA capacities collectively rather than as
wholly independent institutions.187
The institutionalization of shadow war capacity also has a proxy-force
dimension, albeit one with complicated legal implications. The larger special
operations community beyond JSOC participates in a wide array of missions
around the world, including especially Foreign Internal Defense (“FID”)
missions, which provide support to host-state security forces, which in turn
play the front-line role in attempting to suppress insurgents and other
armed groups in their territory.188 Such missions of course have a force-
186. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatus for Drone Kill-
ing, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/g
IQANPdILP_story.html. On the president’s understanding of the utility of JSOC for low-visi-
bility counterterrorism operations, see Klaidman, supra note 1, at 204–05. See also Chesney,
supra note 183, at 562–83 (discussing evolution of JSOC and noting that the CIA has estab-
lished a unit specifically focused on both Somalia and Yemen); Julian E. Barnes & Adam En-
tous, U.S. Seeks Faster Deployment, Wall St. J., May 7, 2012, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303630404577390333494738036.html (describing
proposals for enabling quicker global deployment of “strike teams”); Kimberly Dozier, Spec-
Ops Troops Study to Be Part-Spy, Part-Gumshoe, Associated Press, Jan. 4, 2012, available at 1/
4/12 AP DataStream 08:23:52 (Westlaw) (describing increasing emphasis on training for foren-
sic data-collection during raids, as well as efforts to increase CIA–Special Operations
integration).
187. See Chesney, supra note 183, at 578–80.
188. See, e.g., The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. (2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75150/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg
75150.pdf; Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013 and the
Future Years Defense Program: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong.
45–86 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76541/pdf/CHRG-
112shrg76541.pdf (colloquy before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
reviewing a host of ways in which FID missions support counterterrorism); Otto K. Liller,
Special Operations Forces and Foreign Internal Defense: An Effective Counterterrorism Model
(Feb. 14, 2005) (unpublished paper, Naval War College), www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a46
4349.pdf. For an example of a FID-type mission involving training of Ugandan forces, see Nick
Turse, America’s Shadow Wars in Africa, TomDispatch.com (July 12, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://
www.tomdispatch.com/post/175567/, and John Vandiver, Marines in Support of AFRICOM Es-
tablish Task Force in Sigonella, Stars & Stripes (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/
marines-in-support-of-africom-establish-task-force-in-sigonella-1.156957. For an example of
a FID mission involving considerably more than just training, see Alan Boswell, African Villag-
ers Embrace U.S. Role in Hunt for Lord’s Resistance Army Leader, McClatchy (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/02/13/138737/african-villagers-embrace-us-role.html. See
also David S. Cloud, U.S. Special Forces Commander Seeks to Expand Operations, L.A. Times,
May 5, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/04/world/la-fg-special-forces-
20120505 (citing sources within the special operations community for proposition that recent
proposals to expand discretion of the U.S. Special Operations Command with respect to de-
ployment primarily concern increased capacities “to gather intelligence and build the capabili-
ties of foreign allies to defeat terrorist networks”).
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multiplying effect for the host state itself, but they can also play an impor-
tant role in advancing the U.S. government’s own counterterrorism efforts,
eliminating the need for more overt forms of intervention that might other-
wise arise; by definition, the U.S. role in such missions does not entail direct
application of lethal force or detention. The role of special operations forces
in the Philippines, assisting government forces in suppressing the al
Qaeda–linked Abu Sayyaf movement, provides a good illustration.189 Bear-
ing all this in mind, the proxy model appears to be a still-more-discreet
alternative to the direct-action focus of the shadow war described above—
one that would tend to avoid legal difficulties from a U.S. perspective. The
proxy model can also be viewed as part of the shadow war framework, inso-
far as support-oriented missions happen to provide unique opportunities
for intelligence collection, relationship building, developing access to air-
ports and other important facilities, and forward positioning of personnel
and equipment that might later be useful for other, more direct, forms of
intervention. Recent news accounts of FID or FID-like missions that may be
underway in Africa illustrate these possibilities.190
The upshot of all this is an extraordinary expansion in the practical
capacity of the U.S. government to use lethal force or carry out captures in
denied or otherwise-sensitive locations (whether directly or through the
agency of other governments or proxy forces) without having to commit to
overt, large-footprint military campaigns that would readily be categorized
as armed conflict.191 All of which might well go largely unnoticed and hence
unanalyzed if the shadow war model actually entailed a reliable degree of
189. For a brief overview, see Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines
(JSOTF–P), GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jsotf-
p.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
190. On the importance of nondirect action missions both as a means of bolstering
third-party forces and of intelligence collection, see Eric Schmitt et al., Admiral Pushing for
Freer Hand with Commandos, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2012, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/us/admiral-pushes-for-freer-hand-in-special-forces.html?page
wanted=all. On Africa, see Lolita C. Baldor, US Looks to Expand Military Aid, Intel to Africa,
Associated Press, June 25, 2012, available at 6/25/12 AP DataStream 16:56:56 (Westlaw), and
Craig Whitlock, U.S. Expands Secret Intelligence Operations in Africa, Wash. Post, June 13,
2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-
intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_story.html. Whitlock has also
drawn attention to the role of private contractors in amplifying these efforts, with an emphasis
on their role in intelligence collection. See Craig Whitlock, Contractors Run U.S. Spying Mis-
sions in Africa, Wash. Post, June 14, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/contractors-run-us-spying-missions-in-africa/2012/06/14/gJQAvC4
RdV_story.html. Reliance on contractors, of course, helps to reduce the visibility of the activi-
ties in question, running with the grain of the shadow war approach.
191. On the role of foreign government forces acting with substantial U.S. support as
an element of shadow war, see Craig Whitlock, U.S. Intensifies Its Proxy Fight Against al-Shabab
in Somalia, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-intensifies-its-proxy-fight-against-al-shabab-in-somalia/2011/11/21/
gIQAVLyNtN_story.html. While the CIA is not currently engaged directly in long-term deten-
tion as was the case during the Bush Administration, this could change going forward. No
statute forbids it; the current prohibition stems merely from an executive order issued by
Obama at the outset of his presidency. In the meantime, it is worth noting reports that the
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secrecy. But, of course, it does not. Though some operations may remain
secret, it will never be clear in advance which ones will run the gauntlet of
purposeful leaks, unintentional disclosures, professional investigative report-
ing, and other means by which many—if not most—aspects of U.S. govern-
ment counterterrorism activities end up in the public record. In most cases,
officials would do well to proceed on the assumption that the shadows in
which they operate are neither particularly dark nor sustainable over time.
3. The Legal Consequences of the Shift to Shadow War
The drawdown in Afghanistan, combined with the expansion of the
shadow war model, ensures that the legal architecture of counterterrorism
will be far more contested—and hence less stable—going forward than it
was during the first post-9/11 decade. When U.S. involvement in overt
armed conflict in Afghanistan comes to an end, so too will the other key
stabilizing factor identified in Part II: the existence of at least one location as
to which LOAC indisputably applies and as to which many cases could be
linked.192 The fact patterns that will matter most in the future—the instances
in which the U.S. government will most likely wish to use lethal force or
military detention—will instead increasingly be rooted in other locations,
such as Yemen and Somalia.
It does not follow that LOAC will be irrelevant to future uses of deten-
tion or lethal force. To the extent that the government continues to invoke
LOAC, the persuasiveness of its arguments will vary from case to case. In
some contexts, for example, the government can make relatively conven-
tional arguments that the level of violence in a given state has risen to a level
constituting a noninternational armed conflict, quite apart from whether
there also exists a borderless armed conflict with al Qaeda or its successors.
Where that is the case, and where the level of U.S. participation in those
hostilities warrants the conclusion that it is a party to such a conflict, LOAC
arguments may prove persuasive after all. Yemen currently provides a good
example of an area ripe for such an analysis.193
CIA remains involved in what some might describe as proxy detention via rendition to cooper-
ative local security services. See, e.g., Jeremy Scahill, The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia, Nation,
Aug. 1, 2011, at 11, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-
somalia; Eli Lake, Somalia’s Prisons: The War on Terror’s Latest Front, Daily Beast (June 27,
2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/27/somalia-s-prisons-the-war-
on-terror-s-latest-front.html. Finally, note that counterterrorism involving al Qaeda and its
successors is not the only context in which the shadow war model may prove appealing; Israel
and Iran already engage in what very much appears to be shadow war, and it is possible that
U.S. involvement in that setting could become more direct over time. Cf. Scott Shane, Iran
Adversaries Said to Step up Covert Actions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/world/middleeast/iran-adversaries-said-to-step-up-covert-
actions.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
192. No one argues today that the United States is still engaged in armed conflict gov-
erned by LOAC in Iraq, after all, and Afghanistan seems destined to follow a similar path
(albeit one in which the host-state government is relatively less secure and capable).
193. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, How to Count Armed Conflicts, LieberCode (July 27,
2012, 8:09 AM), http://www.liebercode.org/2012/07/how-to-count-armed-conflicts.html.
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But even in those cases, the very nature of the shadow war approach is
such that there can be no guarantees that such arguments will be accepted,
certainly not as they were during the first post-9/11 decade vis-à-vis Afghan-
istan. And since not all shadow war contexts will match Yemen in support-
ing such a conventional analysis, attempts to invoke LOAC in some cases will
have to stand or fall instead on the far broader argument that the United
States is engaged in a borderless armed conflict governed by LOAC wherever
the parties may be found.
The borderless-conflict position at first blush appears nicely entrenched
in the status quo legal architecture. It is supported, after all, by a substantial
degree of cross-party consensus (it was endorsed most recently in a series of
speeches by Obama Administration officials).194 But it has always been
fiercely disputed, including by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”) and many of America’s allies. That dispute was not so much re-
solved over the past decade as it was persistently avoided; the case law of that
era almost always involved persons who could be linked in some way back to
the undisputed combat zone of Afghanistan. Thanks to the U.S. govern-
ment’s shift toward shadow war, however, this will not be the situation when
new cases arise, as they surely will.195
Making matters worse, the U.S. government’s position on the relevance
of LOAC to its use of detention and lethal force may become harder to
maintain going forward even without a drawdown in Afghanistan due to the
aforementioned decline and fragmentation of al Qaeda. The borderless-con-
flict position does require, after all, identifiable parties on both sides. Even if
one accepts that the United States and al Qaeda are engaged in a borderless
armed conflict, organizational ambiguity of the sort described above will
increasingly call into question whether specific cases are sufficiently linked
to that conflict (or to any other that might be said to exist with respect to
specific al Qaeda–linked groups, such as AQAP). Again Warsame’s situation
provides a useful illustration, or perhaps more accurately, a cautionary tale.
* * *
Though widely perceived at the time as a period of great legal contro-
versy and uncertainty, the first post-9/11 decade will in retrospect be per-
ceived as a comparatively simple state of affairs during which it was largely
undisputed that LOAC applied somewhere and that the central objects of the
U.S. government’s use of detention and lethal force were entities one could
coherently describe as al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. But that period is
ending, and it may be that the second post-9/11 decade will witness far more
serious legal disputes as a result.
194. See Anderson, supra note 58.
195. See infra Part IV; see also Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of
Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all (describing
internal administration process for vetting drone strike decisions, emphasizing focus on
Yemen and Somalia).
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IV. Shifting the Legal Framework onto Firmer Footing
What if anything ought to be done in response to this looming legal
instability? One possibility is to attempt to avoid the difficulty altogether by
changing policy. That is, the government could abandon the use of military
detention (at least in its long-term form) and limit the use of lethal force to
circumstances compatible with a human rights law framework (i.e., circum-
stances involving a strictly imminent threat to human life with no plausible
prospect for arrest). In a speech on May 23, 2013, Obama gestured strongly
in this direction.196 Echoing the observations made above, he pointed out
that the armed conflict with al Qaeda might well draw to a close in the near
future.197 And in the meantime, he explained, the United States would con-
tinue to prefer criminal prosecution to military detention, while limiting its
use of force outside Afghanistan to circumstances involving an array of fac-
tors, including a continuing, imminent threat to American lives and no fea-
sible opportunity for capturing rather than killing the target.198
At first blush these pronouncements give the impression that the legal
issues identified above might cease to matter. On closer inspection, however,
that is far from certain. First, the president’s speech by no means promised
to end the use of long-term military detention, either for the Guantanamo
detainees or for those non-Afghan detainees still in U.S. custody in Afghani-
stan.199 The size of those populations will likely shrink, but some number of
them will remain, along with the legal dilemmas they present. Second, it
remains far from certain just how restrictive the use of force will be under
color of the president’s newly articulated framework. The president was
quite clear that when force was used, it would continue to be under color of
the 2001 AUMF subject to the law of armed conflict, at least for the near
future.200 The legal questions raised by that model accordingly will remain,
even if the number of new instances implicating them shrinks going
forward.
With or without these changes, of course, the government might simply
choose to do nothing in response to the legal uncertainties described
above.201 That is, it might conclude that it can ride out the increasing legal
friction without encountering resistance of a kind that actually upends pol-
icy or practice. Such hopes would likely be dashed, however. I explain why
below and then conclude with a brief discussion of proactive, realistic steps
that the government might take instead.
196. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense Uni-






201. See generally Anderson, supra note 58.
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A. The Coming Wave of Judicial Intervention
The government will not be able to simply ride out the legal friction
generated by the fragmentation of al Qaeda and the shift toward shadow
war. Those trends do not merely shift unsettled questions of substantive law
to the forefront of the debate; they also greatly increase the prospects for a
new round of judicial intervention focusing on those substantive questions.
1. Military Detention
Consider military detention first. Fresh judicial intervention regarding
the substantive law of detention is a virtual certainty. It will come in connec-
tion with the lingering Guantanamo population, and it will come as well in
connection with any future detainees taken into custody on a long-term ba-
sis, regardless of where they might be held.
a. Existing Guantanamo Detainees
Most of the existing Guantanamo detainees have already had a shot at
habeas relief, and many lost on both the facts and the law. But some of them
can and will pursue a second shot, should changing conditions call into
question the legal foundation for the earlier rulings against them.202
The first round of Guantanamo habeas decisions depended in almost
every instance on the existence of a meaningful tie to ongoing hostilities in
Afghanistan, as did the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi. Indeed,
Justice O’Connor in Hamdi was at pains to caution that at some point in the
future this baseline condition making LOAC relevant could unravel.203 The
declining U.S. role in combat operations in Afghanistan goes directly to that
point.
This decline will open the door to a second wave of Guantanamo litiga-
tion, with detainees arguing that neither LOAC nor the relevant statutory
authorities continues to apply. This argument may or may not succeed on
the merits. At first blush, the NDAA FY12 would seem to present a substan-
tial obstacle to the detainees. That statute expressly codifies detention au-
thority as to members (and supporters) of al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and
“associated forces,”204 thus grounding detention authority directly in domes-
tic law rather than requiring courts to impute such authority into the 2001
AUMF by implication from LOAC (as the Supreme Court had to do in
202. An early indication of the next wave of habeas petitions appeared in the summer
of 2012 when a dispute emerged as to whether detainees who had lost their habeas challenges
should have continuing access to counsel. See Steve Vladeck, Habeas, Res Judicata, and Why the
New Guantanamo MOU Is a Big Deal, Lawfare (July 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/habeas-res-judicata-and-why-the-new-guantanamo-mou-is-a-
big-deal/. Implicit in the dispute was the idea that such access sooner or later would be needed
to mount a fresh habeas challenge.
203. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (plurality opinion).
204. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021(a), (b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
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Hamdi itself). But it is not quite so simple. The same section of the NDAA
FY12 relinks the question of detention authority to LOAC after all. It speci-
fies that statutory detention authority as an initial matter exists solely
“pending disposition under the law of war.”205 And although it then lists
long-term military detention as a possible disposition option, the statute
specifically defines this authority as “[d]etention under the law of war with-
out trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the [AUMF].”206
A court confronted with this language might interpret it in a manner
consistent with the government’s borderless-conflict position, such that the
drawdown in Afghanistan would not matter. But it might not. The repeated
references to the “law of war” in the statute—that is to LOAC—might lead
at least some judges to conduct a fresh field-of-application analysis regard-
ing the extent to which LOAC remains applicable in light of the drawdown,
and judges might then read the results back into the NDAA FY12. I am not
saying that this is the likely outcome or that any such analysis would neces-
sarily reject the government’s borderless-conflict position. I am just saying
that judges eventually will decide these matters without real guidance from
Congress (unless Congress clarifies its intentions in the interim). Note, too,
that any such judicial interpretations may well have far broader implications
than just the fate of the particular detainee in question; a ruling that LOAC
has no application in a given situation would cast a long shadow over any
other LOAC-based actions the U.S. government might undertake in the
same or similar contexts (including targeting measures).
Regardless of what occurs in Afghanistan, the existing Guantanamo de-
tainee population might also find occasion to come back to court should the
decline of the core al Qaeda organization continue to the point where it can
plausibly be described as defunct. In such a case, it is likely that at least some
current al Qaeda detainees would revive their habeas petitions in order to
contend that the demise of the organization also means the demise of deten-
tion authority over members of the defunct group. This argument would be
particularly likely to come from those who were held on the ground of
membership in al Qaeda but who the government had not shown to have
been otherwise involved in hostile acts. This would be a challenging argu-
ment to make; the government would surely respond that al Qaeda would
no longer be defunct if some of its members were set free. But setting that
possible response aside, such a petition could compel the government to
litigate the question of whether the continuing existence of various
“franchises,” like AQAP or al-Shabaab, suffices to preserve detention author-
ity over al Qaeda members. That is, such a challenge could lead a judge to
weigh in on the organizational boundary question.
205. Id. § 1021(a).
206. Id. § 1021(c)(1).
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b. New Detainees
The existing Guantanamo detainees are not the only ones who might
require judges to address the increasingly difficult LOAC and organizational
boundary issues. New detainees might do so as well.
As the Warsame situation illustrated, the Obama Administration re-
mains loath to bring new detainees into military custody at Guantanamo.
But Congress could force its hand, should Congress further extend its grow-
ing array of statutory constraints against bringing certain individuals within
the United States for purposes of criminal trial, foreclosing the disposition
option ultimately employed with Warsame. A future Republican administra-
tion, meanwhile, may or may not be so reluctant to make use of Guanta-
namo in the event that it encounters a Warsame-like scenario outside of
Afghanistan. Should any new detainees be taken to Guantanamo, they will
automatically have access to judicial review in accordance with Boumediene.
And in light of the trends described above, it seems quite likely that such
review would turn in no small part on LOAC and organizational boundary
issues.
Might detainees be taken somewhere besides Guantanamo (or U.S. ter-
ritory proper), where habeas jurisdiction is not yet established? The only
other detention facility currently associated with U.S. forces overseas is the
Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan (“DFIP”). But the DFIP is no al-
ternative to Guantanamo, at least not for persons captured outside of Af-
ghanistan. First, although it appears that a small number of detainees were
imported into Afghanistan from elsewhere relatively early in the first post-
9/11 decade, officials have more recently made clear that the Afghan govern-
ment has long since forbidden the practice.207 Second, the United States in
any event has agreed to transfer control of the DFIP to the Afghan govern-
ment.208 And though there is lingering debate as to the functional extent of
this transfer, that debate will likely not survive the completion of the
drawdown in Afghanistan any more than the identical debate survived com-
pletion of the drawdown a few years before in Iraq.209
Even if the DFIP did remain available, or if some other facility somehow
could be made available abroad, placing new detainees there (other than
persons captured and held in Afghanistan while conflict there continues)
would almost certainly precipitate an extension of Boumediene to those de-
tainees too, resulting in judicial review. True, the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in al Maqaleh v. Gates rejected an attempt to invoke habeas jurisdiction
207. See Nominations Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 398–99 (2011)
(testimony of Lieutenant General John R. Allen, U.S. Marine Corps, and Vice Admiral William
H. McRaven, U.S. Navy), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74537/pdf/
CHRG-112shrg74537.pdf.
208. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Islamic Republic of Afg. and the
U.S. on Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afg. (Mar. 9, 2012), availa-
ble at http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/7671.
209. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspec-
tives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 549 (2011).
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by a group of DFIP detainees who had been captured abroad and brought
into Afghanistan years ago.210 The court was careful in its opinion, however,
to emphasize that those transfers occurred prior to Boumediene and that
there was no other basis for believing that the transfers reflected an attempt
to avoid habeas jurisdiction.211 Similar transfers occurring in 2012 or there-
after would quite likely produce a very different outcome.212
2. Lethal Force
Lethal force is a different kettle of fish when it comes to the possibility
of judicial review. In theory, there are two ways the courts could become
involved in assessing the legality of the use of lethal force in the counterter-
rorism setting. First, there could be a criminal investigation resulting in a
civilian prosecution or a court-martial proceeding turning on the legality of
a particular use of force. Incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan involving mem-
bers of the armed forces and private contractors illustrate how this can occur
from time to time, as individuals are prosecuted for allegedly killing civilians
or prisoners.213 The typical case of this kind, however, never turns on or
otherwise raises questions regarding the relevance of LOAC or the organiza-
tional boundaries of the enemy. And there is no prospect that criminal in-
vestigators and prosecutors in the United States, whether civilian or military,
will take steps to change that by opening an investigation into, say, drone
strikes in Yemen. If American courts ever do become involved, then, it will
be pursuant to the second possibility: civil litigation.
In 2010, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”)
attempted to persuade a federal court to intervene prospectively with respect
to Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and member of AQAP who had
become notorious for his role in encouraging others to carry out attacks on
210. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
211. Id. at 98–99. It is also worth noting that on remand in the al Maqaleh litigation,
the district court expressed specific concern about the impact of the looming drawdown on
the jurisdictional question. See Wells Bennett, Read-Out from Motions Hearing in Al-Maqaleh
and Hamidullah, Lawfare (July 16, 2012, 11:02 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/
read-out-from-motions-hearing-in-al-maqaleh-and-hamidullah/.
212. The possibility of proxy detention raises an additional set of complications. The
idea here is that the United States might prefer, for these and other reasons, to persuade other
states to take custody of individuals rather than hold the persons itself. A U.S. citizen allegedly
held in proxy detention has previously succeeded in convincing a court to entertain a habeas
petition. The more interesting question, though, is whether noncitizens could combine that
approach with Boumediene to reach the same outcome. Such cases would of course face tre-
mendously difficult evidentiary hurdles, but it would be a mistake to assume that courts would
outright refuse to consider them, particularly if the context is one of pure shadow war rather
than, say, conventional conflict in Afghanistan.
213. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/02blackwater
.html?gwh=7EB05F0C6176C7A9F38D48DFD3122713; William Yardley, American Soldier Is
Convicted of Killing Afghan Civilians for Sport, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2011, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/us/calvin-gibbs-convicted-of-killing-civilians-in-
afghanistan.html?r=1.
November 2013] Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda 217
the United States. Media reports had indicated that the U.S. government had
tried unsuccessfully to kill al-Awlaki in Yemen through a drone strike and
that al-Awlaki had been placed on a specific list of persons as to whom lethal
force was pre-authorized.214 On behalf of al-Awlaki’s father, the ACLU and
CCR filed a civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that
killing al-Awlaki without judicial process, “far from any field of armed con-
flict,” and without the presence of exigent circumstances involving a strictly
imminent threat to life would violate both international law and the
Constitution.215
Ultimately, the district judge dismissed the suit on two primary
grounds.216 First, he concluded that al-Awlaki’s father had no standing to act
on his behalf in this ex ante setting.217 Second, he concluded that the issues
presented constituted a political question as to which courts should not ex-
ercise jurisdiction.218 He also nodded favorably in the direction of a third
argument—that the state-secrets privilege would ultimately preclude litiga-
tion of the claims—without actually relying on it.219
The ACLU and CCR did not appeal, perhaps mindful that doing so
might simply result in a more authoritative and influential but equally hos-
tile ruling from the court of appeals. And so the issue appeared to come to
rest, with no realistic prospect that judges would ever engage the LOAC and
organizational boundary issues in a use-of-force setting. It would not be
prudent, however, to assume that this was the last word.
In July 2012, the ACLU and CCR filed a new suit, this time in the form
of a wrongful death action in the wake of drone strikes that killed al-Awlaki,
his teenage son, and another American citizen involved in AQAP, Samir
Khan.220 The standing issue is no longer a serious obstacle in light of the
relatively clear capacity of the decedent’s relatives to act in this wrongful
death–style setting, thus removing one linchpin of the earlier ruling. The
political question and state-secrets obstacles remain as before, though, and
hence the prospects for the suit making it to the merits are not strong. But
pause to consider what effect might follow from increasing awareness of the
destabilizing trends described above in Part III, including both the uncer-
tainties associated with the enemy’s organizational boundaries and the larger
embrace of the shadow war model. These developments do not directly un-
dermine the doctrinal foundations of the political question analysis in the
214. See, e.g., Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding
Yemen on Strikes, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239_pf.html.
215. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
alaulaqi_v_obama_complaint_0.pdf.
216. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1.
217. Id. at 14–35.
218. Id. at 44–52.
219. Id. at 52–54.
220. See Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July 18,
2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/tk_complaint_to_file.pdf.
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prior suit, nor do they chip away at the state-secrets considerations lurking
as the next obstacle for the plaintiffs. And yet it is not so difficult to imagine
that when these issues eventually come before a court of appeals or the Su-
preme Court several years from now, the unfolding of these trends will have
had a sufficiently unsettling impact so as to give considerable pause to some
judges or justices—potentially enough to tip the scales against continued
application of those threshold avoidance doctrines.221
That is, of course, a speculative leap of some distance. But it would be
foolish to dismiss the prospect out of hand; similar skepticism once sur-
rounded the efforts of Guantanamo detainees to establish habeas jurisdic-
tion after all. As we progress toward the shadow war model, it takes us ever
further from the paradigmatic conventional-war model with which maxi-
mized judicial deference has traditionally been associated. Insofar as courts
grow increasingly attracted to the notion that the legal framework for target-
ing can and should be closely linked to that for detention, the existing judi-
cial beachheads relating to the latter could have the effect of making a
breakout into targeting jurisdiction conceptually less shocking and more
plausible.
B. Options for Refining the Legal Architecture
Are there realistic yet useful steps the government could take now, bear-
ing in mind both the legal instability described above and the likelihood that
those issues will be litigated? Or would it be wiser to simply stay the course,
while continuing to defend the legal merits of current policy through public
statements and preparing to do the same if and when litigation requires it?
The Obama Administration has been focused on the latter approach.
Building on the precedent of public engagement set by State Department
Legal Adviser John Bellinger during the Bush Administration’s second
term,222 it has been commendably active in dispatching senior officials to
give public speeches defending the legality of its detention and lethal force
practices, with at least some emphasis on the elements of geographic and
organizational uncertainty described above.223 The Obama Administration
has resisted, in contrast, taking affirmative steps to alter the legal status quo
in a direction that might reduce that uncertainty.
To be sure, the Obama Administration did ultimately sign into law the
NDAA FY12, but it did so quite reluctantly insofar as its detention-related
221. Note, too, that efforts to stop or constrain drone strikes via litigation will not be
confined to U.S. courts. See Adam Entous et al., Drone Program Attacked by Human-Rights
Groups, Wall. St. J., Dec. 9, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529
70204319004577086841225927590.html (describing plans by human rights groups to mount
“a broad-based campaign that will include legal challenges in courts in Pakistan, Europe and
the U.S.”).
222. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 160; John Bellinger, Armed Conflict with Al Qaida?,
Opinio Juris (Jan. 15, 2007, 12:01 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/15/armed-conflict-
with-al-qaida/.
223. See Anderson, supra note 58.
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measures were concerned. And its reluctance was directly connected to a
mistaken sense that the legal architecture had already reached a point of
stable equilibrium. The evidence for this can be found in a statement of
administration policy (“SAP”) the White House issued in late 2011 while the
NDAA FY12 was still pending. In reference to the bill’s detention-related
provisions, the SAP stated,
Because the authorities codified in this section already exist, the Adminis-
tration does not believe codification is necessary and poses some risk. After
a decade of settled jurisprudence on detention authority, Congress must be
careful not to open a whole new series of legal questions that will distract
from our efforts to protect the country. While the current language mini-
mizes many of those risks, future legislative action must ensure that the
codification in statute of express military detention authority does not
carry unintended consequences that could compromise our ability to pro-
tect the American people.224
The SAP quite properly observes that affirmative steps to alter the status
quo would carry risks in the nature of unintended consequences (not coinci-
dentally, the NDAA FY12 was in fact stuffed with problematic collateral
measures designed to micromanage and constrain the president’s ability to
make decisions regarding the disposition of military detainees).225 That is a
point well taken, raising the question of whether there is enough to be
gained by change to offset such risks. The SAP’s negative answer, alas, de-
pended explicitly on the assumption that the relevant law has already been
“settled” thanks to years of detention case law and that there was thus noth-
ing to be gained by revisiting the issue in legislation. This is, however, pre-
cisely the settlement that is unraveling due to the ongoing fragmentation of
al Qaeda, the drawdown in Afghanistan, and the shift toward shadow war.
As we have seen, the NDAA FY12 ultimately did become law, yet it did
little to amend the legal architecture for detention—let alone for lethal
force—to account for looming instability. Could more have been done? I
close with a handful of preliminary suggestions, in hopes of informing fur-
ther debate.226
224. Statement of Administration Policy, S. 1867—National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 2012, White House 1–2 (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_20111117.pdf (emphasis added).
225. See also Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Isn’t Hot for New Law to Bless Al-Qaida War,
Wired (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/pentagon-isnt-
hot-for-a-new-law-blessing-al-qaeda-war/ (reporting that the administration was generally
fearful of congressional constraints on its discretion to “use nonmilitary means of confronting
al-Qaida”). Ackerman observed at the time that one cost of this approach was increased vul-
nerability of the detention legal architecture in light of al Qaeda’s evolution and the passage of
time. See id. (citing, inter alia, similar concerns expressed by Rep. Mac Thornberry).
226. A truly complete answer to that question of course calls for a very broad discus-
sion indeed, one that begins from a well-grounded sense of the strategic goals that the United
States seeks to advance in its counterterrorism policy, the relation of that policy to other and
perhaps larger strategic aims, and so forth. This Article, however, is not the place for such a
discussion. My narrow aim in the concluding pages instead is to outline a handful of steps
specifically responsive to the disruptions described above, in hopes of fueling a larger and
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1. Clarifying the Enemy
There are two legal dimensions to the problem of increasing organiza-
tional uncertainty: disagreement as to the boundaries of al Qaeda as such
and disagreement as to whether the use of force or detention in any event
should extend to other groups. The NDAA FY12 did nothing to address the
first issue, as it made no attempt to define al Qaeda. As for the second issue,
the NDAA FY12 did formally recognize a category of “associated forces,” but
it did not actually define that phrase and hence did nothing to advance un-
derstanding of its content. The Obama Administration, for its part, has indi-
cated that we may flesh out the “associated force” concept by reference to
the international law concept of cobelligerency. Unfortunately, this approach
on close inspection does not actually yield particularly helpful yardsticks
when mapped onto the context of clandestine nonstate actors. Nor does it
speak at all to the initial question of how to determine whether a particular
group is part of al Qaeda to begin with, bearing in mind the fragmentation
trend. And it also will be of little use if and when we reach the point that al
Qaeda itself is effectively destroyed, thus removing the predicate for a cobel-
ligerency type of analysis.
More could be done. First, with respect to the problem of al Qaeda’s
increasingly uncertain organizational boundaries, Congress could specify a
statutory standard that the executive branch could then bring to bear in light
of the latest intelligence, with frequent reporting to Congress as to the re-
sults of its determinations. The trick, of course, is in specifying the proper
standard: A functional test turning on whether al Qaeda’s senior leadership
in fact exercises direction and control over another group’s activities, at least
at a high level of generality? A formal test turning on whether the other
group has formally proclaimed obedience to al Qaeda’s senior leaders? It
may be that the best approach is to specify both tests as alternative sufficient
conditions. In any event, periodic decisions by the executive branch regard-
ing the application of these tests to particular groups should then be re-
ported in a timely fashion to Congress (something the NDAA FY12 already
requires vis-à-vis “associated forces” determinations), along with both de-
tailed classified explanations of the underlying analysis and a corresponding
unclassified statement informing the public of the determination and as
much of the underlying rationale as is consistent with proper protection of
sources and methods.
Second, with respect to the problem of identifying separate organiza-
tions (beyond al Qaeda) against whom force or detention might be directed,
Congress could abandon the “associated forces” concept altogether in favor
more sustained debate, building on earlier contributions by authors including Benjamin Wit-
tes, Detention and Denial (2011); Anderson, supra note 58; Daskal, supra note 62; and
Philip Zelikow, Address, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War, 49 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 44–50
(2012).
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of an alternative approach. It could, for example, explicitly name the addi-
tional entities against which force is authorized,227 much as the NDAA FY12
names al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. This approach has the virtue of
maximum clarity and hence improved democratic accountability. It also has
the virtue of not artificially attempting to tie all threats back to al Qaeda, the
AUMF, and the ever-receding 9/11 attacks themselves. Of course, some
might object to this approach on the ground that fast-paced changes in the
field could require Congress to repeatedly return to the task of making such
designations, possibly at the cost of slowing or disrupting the executive
branch’s willingness to act in the interim. One might respond, however, that
the executive branch may always fall back on its inherent Article II authority
to act in defense of the nation when circumstances truly warrant it, at least
when it comes to the use of force. Moreover, if instead the matter is a ques-
tion of long-term detention authority, then there will be, by definition, am-
ple time for Congress to act after all.228
2. Sidestepping the LOAC Dilemma
Can Congress also make a useful contribution in terms of reducing un-
certainty regarding the relevance of LOAC? This is a more complicated
matter.
The answer is probably no if we are speaking of Congress literally over-
riding the field-of-application debate by simply asserting that LOAC by its
own terms applies across the board in the shadow war context. It is doubtful
that a federal court in some future habeas case or other proceeding would
feel bound by such a determination (and it certainly would do nothing to
quell criticisms from allies and others who take a more restrictive view of
LOAC’s field of application). That said, there are other ways in which Con-
gress might usefully speak to LOAC-related questions.
Congress could require, as a matter of domestic law, that all relevant
uses of force or military detention be subject to LOAC rules, even if LOAC is
not applicable of its own force. And Congress could clarify that it intends to
227. Note, in this respect, that there are some who question the need to take such steps
in relation to every entity that may emerge as having ties to al Qaeda. See, e.g., John Mueller,
Why Al-Qaeda May Never Die, Nat’l Int. (May 1, 2012), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/why-al-qaeda-may-never-die-6873.
228. Article II arguably confers on the president at least some degree of authority to use
lethal force in limited circumstances as a matter of self-defense, even absent conditions of
armed conflict formally triggering LOAC. See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 18–23 (Series on Counterterrorism and Am. Statutory Law,
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson. Indeed, it is
possible that on some occasions drone strikes may have been quietly predicated on such a
theory. Cf. Becker & Shane, supra note 195 (reporting that the internal debate over whether it
would be proper to target the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban—the Pakistani Taliban—ended after a
determination that he posed a threat to American personnel in Pakistan). The much harder
question is whether Article II self-defense authority can also be cited as the foundation for
employing military detention, particularly for detention lasting a long period of time.
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authorize all actions that can be taken compatible with that rubric. This
would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility that a judge at
some point would conclude that detention or lethal force was not authorized
in a given context solely on the ground that LOAC’s field-of-application test
was not satisfied after all. And in doing so, Congress might specifically state
that the resulting availability of detention authority does not depend on the
continuation of U.S. involvement in conflict in Afghanistan but rather de-
pends on the continued hostilities between the United States and the statu-
torily identified group as to which a given detainee is linked.229
Of course, none of that would appeal at all to those who object to the
U.S. government’s existing practice of claiming LOAC authority to justify
detention or lethal force beyond the political borders of specific areas of
high-intensity conflict such as Afghanistan; on the contrary, those critics
would surely object fiercely, no doubt arguing that such actions by Congress
would place the United States in violation of international law. One might
reply that the uncertain status quo is actually worse, in that it arguably in-
centivizes reliance on rendition, detention by other governments, and the
use of lethal force in lieu of detention.230 One might add, moreover, that
resistance to application of LOAC norms, if successful, will not automatically
produce a situation in which the U.S. government accepts that its actions
instead are subject to international human rights law instruments such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). After
all, the U.S. government currently takes the position that the ICCPR does
not apply outside U.S. sovereign territory.231 Successful resistance to the
LOAC model, from this perspective, might leave international law entirely
on the sidelines, except perhaps for constraints of necessity and proportion-
ality that might follow should the U.S. government be acting under the ru-
bric of self-defense.232
There are additional steps, however, that Congress might take to address
rights-oriented concerns. As an initial matter, Congress could clarify that the
LOAC rules are binding on all U.S. government entities, including the CIA.
Supporters of the status quo should not object to this specification, for if the
229. Cf. Rick Pildes, The Fundamental Transformation in the Law, Morality and Politics
of War: Individuating the Responsibility of “Enemies”, Lawfare (July 24, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/the-fundamental-transformation-in-the-law-morality-and-
politics-of-war-individuating-the-responsibility-of-enemies/.
230. See, e.g., Klaidman, supra note 1, at 126 (“The mission was a success . . . . But it
also masked deeper concerns. Rumors swirled through the Pentagon that Nabhan had been
killed because the White House didn’t want to face the tangled and politically fraught deten-
tion issues.”); Becker & Shane, supra note 195 (describing congressional concerns along these
lines, and also noting the preservation of the rendition option during the Obama Administra-
tion); cf. Wittes, supra note 226.
231. See John Bellinger, Administration Submits ICCPR Report, Punts on Extraterritorial
Application, Lawfare (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/adminis-
tration-submits-iccpr-report-punts-on-extraterritorial-application/ (discussing the most re-
cent statement of the U.S. government’s position on the matter).
232. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 3, 26 (2011).
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recent spate of speeches by Obama Administration officials is an accurate
guide, it would not actually alter current U.S. government practices.233 Addi-
tionally, Congress might entrench in statute the proposition that lethal force
will not be used in a given location without the consent of the host govern-
ment except in circumstances where the host government is unable or un-
willing to take reasonable steps to suppress a threat.234 This too would reflect
existing U.S. government practice,235 yet the absence of a more formal ex-
pression of the policy creates space for critics to argue that the United States
might soon conduct drone strikes on the streets of Paris.
Congress might also consider embracing rather than fleeing from the
involvement of the judiciary. I have in mind two steps. First, Congress could
expressly extend Guantanamo-style habeas jurisdiction to all persons held
under color of the authorization described above—no matter where they are
held—with the sole exception being persons captured and held in Afghani-
stan prior to the end of the drawdown process.236 As noted above, this is the
result that will likely attach in any event by the extension of Boumediene.
And one should not forget that after years of government resistance to judi-
cial involvement at Guantanamo, the net result of the habeas process has
done more than a little to quell concerns about the legitimacy and legality of
detention there (notwithstanding that some critics remain). Second, Con-
gress might also consider judicial involvement at the back end, making peri-
odic determinations of whether specific individuals ought to be released
notwithstanding their initial eligibility for detention—something that under
the NDAA FY12 and executive branch practice has thus far been a purely
executive branch affair.237
This brings us to a particularly vexing question: What, if anything,
should Congress say regarding Americans and actions undertaken in U.S.
territory? The interaction of these questions with constitutional rights is a
large topic, well beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum, however, it
would be sound for Congress to specify that any force it has authorized does
not extend to the use of lethal force within the United States barring exigent
circumstances.
233. See, e.g., Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Remarks at Harvard Law School on the CIA and the Rule of Law (Apr. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.cfr.org/rule-of-law/cia-general-counsel-stephen-prestons-remarks-rule-law-april-
2012/p27912 (indicating that CIA uses of force would comport with necessity, proportionality,
and other LOAC rules, while remaining arguably uncommitted as to the extent of compliance
with non-LOAC international law rules), cited in Anderson, supra note 58.
234. Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-
territorial Self-Defense, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 483 (2012).
235. Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, U.S.
Dep’t of State (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, cited
in Anderson, supra note 58.
236. Should a new Afghanistan– or Iraq–style overt combat deployment occur, of
course, Congress would be able to revisit the scope of this exception to avoid judicial intrusion
into conventional battlefield settings.
237. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1023, 125 Stat. 1298, 1564–65 (2011).
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It is tempting to continue in this vein, advocating additional measures
such as the removal of the draconian constraints on detainee transfers and
criminal prosecution that have made Guantanamo an undesirable destina-
tion even if one is not opposed to using the facility in principle. But my aim
in this Section is not to provide a comprehensive solution. Rather, I hope to
spark a larger conversation that I believe must occur in light of the unfolding
dynamics of the second post-9/11 decade. I therefore will end here simply by
noting that if Congress were to adopt the arrangements I have described or
something like them, it would be well advised to sunset the whole thing—
and to do so at a time designed not to fall directly into the teeth of some
future election campaign season.
Conclusion
I intend this Article as a wake-up call. At first blush, the legal architec-
ture relating to detention and lethal force in the counterterrorism setting
today appears stable, the beneficiary of a remarkable amount of cross-
branch and cross-party consensus. This pleases some and enrages others.
For better or worse, however, the underpinnings of this stability are rapidly
eroding in the face of long-term trends involving the strategic posture of
both al Qaeda and the United States. Change looms—indeed, the effects can
already be felt—and it is past time to recognize precisely how that change
will disrupt the status quo and to grapple seriously with the options for
refining the legal architecture in response.
